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Abstract
Why are some sale items subject to limited availability while other substitute items are available
in large quantities and are priced relatively high at the same point in time? Can such a retail
strategy lure consumers into purchasing the more expensive item? This paper characterizes the
prot-maximizing pricing and product-availability strategies for a retailer selling two substitute
goods to loss-averse consumers and shows that limited-availability sales can manipulate consumers
into an ex-ante unfavorable purchase. Consumers have unit demand, are interested in buying only one
good, and their reference point is given by their recent rational expectations about what consumption
value they would receive and what price they would pay. The seller maximizes prots by raising the
consumersreference point through a tempting discount on a good available only in limited supply
(the bargain) and cashing in with a high price on the other good (the rip-o¤), which the consumers
buy if the bargain is not available to minimize their disappointment. The seller might prefer to o¤er
a deal on the more valuable product, using it as a bait, because consumers feel a larger loss, in terms
of forgone consumption, if this item is not available. I also show that the bargain item can be a loss
leader, that the sellers product line is not welfare-maximizing and that she might supply a socially
wasteful product. The model suggests that the current FTC Guides Against Bait Advertising, by
allowing retailers to employ limited-availability sales, could reduce consumer and social welfare.
JEL classication: D11; D42; L11.
Keywords: Retail Pricing; Reference-Dependent Preferences; Loss Aversion; Limited Availabil-
ity; Bait and Switch; Loss Leaders.
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1 Introduction
Retailers frequently use low prices and o¤er deals to attract consumers. In many cases, these
deals apply only to a subset of a stores product line and are often subject to limited availability.
Some shops, for example, o¤er deals that are valid only while supplies last, or they might o¤er
price reductions on sale items only to the very rst customers of the day. Consider the two following
examples:
Example 1 A retailer in Berkeley California has o¤ered the following:
Converse All Star high-top in black for just $24.99 (o¤er valid while supplies last).
Any other color for $54.99.1
Example 2 On Black Friday 2011, Best Buy o¤ered, among other items, the following:
Panasonic 50" Class / Plasma / 1080p / 600Hz / Smart HDTV for $599.99.
Panasonic 50" Class / Plasma / 720p / 600Hz / HDTV for $799.99.2
In the rst example, the store is o¤ering a deal on black shoes  $20 less than the regular price.
There is, however, no deal on other colors; indeed their price is $10 higher than the regular price. The
$30 di¤erence between the price of black and non-black shoes is unlikely to be explained by di¤erences
in cost or demand. Furthermore, the deal on black shoes is valid only while current supplies last and the
price could well be higher once the store restocks. In the second example, the store is selling two very
similar TVs for very di¤erent prices; moreover, somewhat puzzlingly, the TV with the higher-resolution
screen, universally preferred, is o¤ered at a lower price. The original Best Buy ad specied that the
one on the superior TV was an online-only deal, that availability was limited to warehouse quantity,
and no rainchecks would be o¤ered to consumers. Notice also that the goods in these examples are
substitutes and consumers normally buy at most one unit. Why, then, do stores discount only a few
items heavily, and why is there so much dispersion, within the same store, in the price of similar goods?
How do stores select which products to o¤er for a discount?
Traditional search-theoretic models of sales based on costly information acquisition are not well-
equipped to answer these questions, as they pertain mainly to retailers supplying only one product.
Moreover, they are concerned with explaining price dispersion either across di¤erent stores (as in Salop
and Stiglitz, 1977) or across di¤erent time periods (as in Varian, 1980), not with the issue of within-store
price dispersion across similar items, nor they look at the role of product availability in retailing.3
1At the same retailer, Bancroft Clothing Co., the regular price during the non-dealweeks is $44.99, independent of
color. The manufacturer online price is $50 plus shipping fees.
2Black Friday is the day following American Thanksgiving and traditionally marks the beginning of the Christmas
shopping season. The 1080p TV rst appeared at Best Buy on March 20, 2011 for $1,000 and its price has been constant
until Thanksgiving Day of the same year. The 720p TV rst appeared at Best Buy on March 28 for $719.99 and its
price was reduced to $649.99 on August 9, 2011 and raised again up to $799.99 on November 10, 2011, two weeks before
Thanksgiving. These data have been collected using camelbuy.com, a website that provides a price tracker and price
history charts for products sold online at Amazon.com and Best Buy.com.
3For an extensive survey of the search theory literature in IO, see Baye, Morgan and Scholten (2006). Rhodes (2012)
and Zhou (2012) study multi-product search models with complements. A notable exception is provided by Konishi and
Sandfort (2002). In their paper a multi-product store can increase its prots by discounting only some of its products,
even when they are substitutes. However, consumers in this model shop for a search goodand hence they learn their
tastes only once they arrive at the store and discounts on few items are a way to increase store tra¢ c. The logic in my
model is quite di¤erent.
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In this paper, I propose a model of bait-and-switch where a retailer uses limited-availability bargain
sales to exploit consumersloss-aversion and prompt them to willfully engage in an ex-ante unfavorable
purchase. I do so by introducing consumer loss aversion into an otherwise classical model of linear
pricing: a risk-neutral prot-maximizing monopolist sells two substitutable goods to homogeneous
consumers who demand at most one unit altogether and whose reference point for evaluating a purchase,
following the model of K½oszegi and Rabin (2006), is given by their recent rational expectations about
the purchase itself. With these preferences, a consumers willingness to pay for a good is determined
not only by his intrinsic value for it, but also endogenously by the market conditions and his own
anticipated behavior. Moreover, the monopolist can directly a¤ect consumersexpectations by making
announcements regarding prices or availability. For example, if a consumer expects to buy with high
probability, he experiences a loss if he fails to buy. This, in turn, increases his willingness to pay. On
the other hand, compared to the possibility of getting a deal, paying a high price is assessed by the
consumer as more of a loss, which in turn decreases his willingness to pay. Since expectations are the
reference point and because expectations are (also) about own future behavior, the reference point is
determined endogenously in the model by requiring that the (possibly stochastic) outcome implied by
optimizing behavior conditional on expectations coincides with expectations.
The main result of the paper is that, when two goods have a similar social value, the prot-
maximizing strategy for the monopolist is to o¤er a limited-availability deal on one of the goods and
then cash in with a high price on the other. Consumers perceive this limited-availability sale as
equivalent to a lottery on both which good they will end up with and how much they will pay. The
price of the good on sale (the bargain) is chosen such that it is not credible for the consumers to
expect not to buy it. Thus, the limited-availability deal works as a bait in luring consumers into the
store.4 Then, because the consumers expect to make a purchase with positive probability and dislike
the uncertainty in their consumption outcomes, in the event that the bargain is not available, they
prefer to buy the substitute good, even at a higher price (the rip-o¤ ). In other words, consumers go
to the store enticed by the possibility of the bargain, but if it is not there they buy a substitute good
as a means of reducing their disappointment.5
I distinguish two cases depending on whether the two items are valued similarly by the consumers.
If the goods are closesubstitutes, the seller chooses a price of the bargain and a price of the rip-o¤
that are farther away than consumersvaluations. If instead the products are distantsubstitutes, the
seller prices them closely or even equally. Hence, under limited availability and loss aversion, dispersion
in prices and dispersion in valuations are inversely related. This provides a possible explanation for
why relatively similar goods are often o¤ered at di¤erent prices, like the shoes in Example 1 above
and, at the same time, why di¤erent goods are sometimes priced equally, like in all-you-can-eat bu¤et
restaurants.
4There is a reason why in Black Friday jargon these deals are called doorbusters.
5Because of loss aversion, consumers are willing to pay a premium in order to avoid the feeling of loss resulting from
not getting the bargain. So, the seller is not exploiting a cognitive bias of the consumers. This is in contrast to several
models with boundedly rational or naïve consumers, as in DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004), Eliaz and Spiegler (2006,
2008, 2011b), Gabaix and Laibson (2006), Grubb (2009), Rubinstein and Spiegler (2008), and Spiegler (2006). See Spiegler
(2011) for a textbook treatment.
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The limited-availability nature of the deal is critical for this strategy to work, and the degree of
availability of each item is publicly announced by the seller. On the one hand, a high likelihood of
availability for the bargain makes the consumers more attached to the idea of buying. This allows the
seller to charge a higher price on the rip-o¤. On the other hand, a greater availability of the bargain
necessarily means fewer sales of the rip-o¤. When choosing the supply level of the bargain item, the
seller optimally trades o¤ these two e¤ects. I also show that if the bargain is the product with the
smaller social surplus, its availability is bounded above by 50%, implying that less than half of the
consumers actually end up buying the item on sale.6
According to the current FTC regulation, it is not a bait-and-switch if the store communicates up-
front that availability is limited.7 Nevertheless, the popular press and various consumersassociations
seem to perceive limited-availability deals as being of an exploitative nature, as suggested by the
following quotes:
One of the biggest problems during signicant sale days like Black Friday is the deceptive
practice of o¤ering a popular, expensive item for a great sale price, but only stocking a very
limited number of these products. This is somewhat of a bait-and-switch because even if
that product is unavailable, you are likely to stay at the store and take advantage of other,
less valuable sales. (Denver Better Business Bureau, http://denver.bbb.org)
Know why they call it Black Friday?It isnt because those sale items push retailers into
the black (accounting speak for protability). Those sale items are almost always loss
leaders  items sold at a loss in order to lure you into the store in the hope youll buy
other, more protable items. What really pushes retailers into the black are the protable
items you buy because you showed up at 4am and everything you hoped to buy was sold out
and you HAD to buy SOMETHING. (http://www.thewisdomjournal.com/Blog/beware-of-
black-friday-bait-and-switch/)
The above quotes seem to imply that among the consumers who go shopping during sales with the
intention of getting a deal, some fulll their goal and get a bargain; others, however, might not nd
what they were looking for and might end up buying a di¤erent and often not-on-sale item.8 But, if
they know in advance that the chance of getting a deal is small, why do consumers go shopping anyway?
6Besides Black Friday, other examples of limited-availability sales that take place in the U.S. are: (i) Cyber Monday, the
rst Monday after Thanksgiving Day, which mainly pertains to online shopping; (ii) Back-to-School Sales taking place at
the end of summer when most schools and colleges begin their school year; and (iii) the The Running of the Brides, which
was a one-day sale of wedding gowns that used to take place in many Filenes Basement stores (in December 2011 Filenes
Basement declared bankruptcy and went out of business). Moreover, many big national retailers, like Target and Toys
R Us, have begun to hold Black Friday-style sales during the summer as well (see http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/07/22/AR2010072206101.html)
7The current FTC Guides Against Bait Advertising require retailers to have available at all outlets listed in the adver-
tisement a su¢ cient quantity of the advertised product to meet reasonably anticipated demands, unless the advertisement
clearly and adequately discloses that supply is limited and/or the merchandise is available only at designated outlets(16
C.F.R. Part 238.3).
8Empirical studies in marketing and psychology reveal indeed that consumers are likely to buy substitute items when
their preferred product is out of stock, and even more so if the product they were planning to buy was on sale or if the
seller had announced up-front that quantities were limited. I review the evidence about consumersresponse to stockouts
in Section 2.
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Interestingly, by exploiting the time inconsistency of the consumerspreferences, with a limited-
availability strategy the seller is able to push the consumers reservation utility below zero. This is
possible because with expectations-based reference-dependent preferences, the consumersparticipa-
tion constraint is belief-dependent  and therefore endogenous  and the seller can manipulate the
consumersbeliefs with her own strategy.9 The intuition is as follows: if a consumer expects to nd
a product he likes available for a very low price, he will denitely plan to buy it. The attachment to
the good induced by realizing that he will do so, however, changes his attitudes toward the purchasing
decision. If the store runs out of the good on sale for a low price, but has a similar one available for a
higher price, the consumer must now choose between a loss of money from paying a higher price and a
loss of consumption from returning home empty-handed. While, in equilibrium, buying the expensive
substitute is indeed the best response to his expectations, it is still worse than if he could have avoided
the feeling of loss by avoiding the expectation of getting the bargain in the rst place. More gener-
ally, because an expectations-based loss-averse consumer does not internalize the e¤ect of his ex-post
behavior on ex-ante expectations, the strategy that maximizes ex-ante expected utility is often not a
credible plan. Moreover, consumers are hurt also by the uncertainty about which item they will get
to consume and how much they will pay. Thus, despite the fact that, with some probability, they get
a good deal, on average consumers are hurt by limited-availability bargain sales. Hence, the current
FTC Guides Against Bait Advertising, by allowing stores to credibly announce that they have limited
supplies for bargain items, might have the perverse e¤ect of reducing consumerswelfare.
Despite the products being substitutes, loss aversion endogenously creates positive demand spillovers
between them so that the higher a consumers intrinsic valuation for a product, the higher his willingness
to pay is for a substitute of that product as well. When the goods are vertically di¤erentiated, the seller
tends to use the more valuable item as the bargain. This may, at rst, seem odd, given that consumers
are (intrinsically) willing to pay a higher price for the superior good. Yet, exactly because consumers
value the superior item more, the possibility of getting it for a bargain makes them feel a larger loss, in
terms of forgone consumption, when this item is not available; hence, they are willing to pay a lot to
avoid (or mitigate) this loss, which, in turn, allows the seller to charge a higher price for the rip-o¤. So
my model predicts that more valuable items should be more likely to be used as baits, as in Example
2 above.
A related implication is that the monopolist, in order to e¤ectively induce uncertainty into the con-
sumerspurchasing plans, might introduce a less socially desirable or, worse, socially wasteful product
and the prot-maximizing product line could di¤er from the socially optimal one.10 Although this
implication appears also in models of second-degree price discrimination via quality distortion (i.e.,
Deneckere and McAfee, 1996), the motive in this case is not to screen the consumers, but rather to
exploit the aforementioned positive spillover e¤ect by selling a less valuable product at a higher price.
Furthermore, the bargain item can be a loss leader (i.e., being priced below cost). Traditional
models of consumer behavior can explain the use of loss leaders for complementary goods (see Ambrus
9Spiegler (2012b) studies the problem of incentivizing participation for agents with expectations-based reference-
dependent preferences in more general environments.
10Klemperer and Padilla (1997) obtain a similar result in an oligopoly model where consumers have classical preferences
and multi-unit demand. For this environment they show that a rm might want to introduce an additional, socially
wastful variety, because of a protable business stealing e¤ect.
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and Weinstein, 2008); my model instead can rationalize the use of loss leaders for substitutes. With
classically assumed reference-free preferences, the scope for using loss leaders is to increase store tra¢ c;
however, for this increase in store tra¢ c to be protable, consumers must buy other items in addition to
the loss leader. In my model, instead, loss leaders lure consumers into the store, but their protability
stems from the fact that, if the seller has run out of the loss-leading product, consumers will buy another
item instead of the loss leader in order to minimize their disappointment. Moreover, while traditional
models  like the one of Lal and Matutes (1994)  suggest that products with lower reservation
prices are more natural candidates to be loss leaders, my model can explain the use of highly valuable
products as loss leaders.11 This is consistent with the observation that, on Black Friday, Best Buy
o¤ers a below-cost large-screen at TV to the rst ten people who buy one.
My paper is related to, and builds upon, the analysis in Heidhues and K½oszegi (forthcoming),
which provides an explanation for why regular prices are sticky, but sales prices are variable, based
on expectations-based loss aversion. In their model, a single-product monopolist maximizes prots by
committing to a stochastic-price strategy made of low, variable sales prices and a high, sticky regular
price. Their result and mine share a similar intuition: low prices work as baits to attract the consumers
who, once in the store, are willing to pay a price even above their intrinsic valuation to avoid the
loss resulting from going home empty-handed. The key-di¤erence in my paper is that I consider a
monopolist who sells two goods and uses one of them as a bait to attract the consumers and the other
one to exploit them. My result on the optimality of limited-availability sales can be seen as a foundation
as well as a more plausible re-interpretation of their result about the optimality of random-price sales.12
Katz and Nelson (1990) also study product availability and price dispersion for the case of a monop-
olist selling two substitutable goods to consumers with downward sloping and continuous multi-unit
demand, who can choose whether to enter the market and have type-dependent outside options. They
show that if the monopolist can credibly commit to have stockouts, there exists a two-price equilibrium
in which the lower-price brand is understocked. However, they study only the case of perfect substi-
tutes and their main result relies on the assumption that once a consumer enters the store, he forfeits
his outside option and if faced with a stockout of the low-priced brand, he must buy the expensive
one. In my model, instead, the consumersbehavior in the event of a stockout is not assumed, but
it arises endogenously in equilibrium because consumers have expectations-based reference-dependent
preferences and prefer to buy the expensive substitute instead of leaving the store empty-handed.
There are a few papers analyzing on the role of product availability as a strategic variable in various
oligopoly settings (see Daughety and Reinganum, 1991; Chakravarty and Ghose, 1994; Balachander
and Farquhar, 1994; Dana, 2001b; Watson, 2009). In these models, rms supply only one product and
by competing (also) in availability, they are able to charge higher prices. However, how availability
interplays with a rms other strategic variables (quantity or price) varies considerably between the
papers depending on the specic details of each model.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briey summarizes the key empirical
evidence on sales and limited availability. Section 3 describes the baseline model with homogeneous
11Kamenica (2008) proposes a model of contextual inference from product lines where a rm may try to manipulate
consumersbeliefs by introducing premium loss leaders  expensive goods of overly high quality that increase the demand
for other goods.
12 I discuss in more detail the similarities and di¤erences with Heidhues and K½oszegi (forthcoming) in Section 7.
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consumers and the features of market demand when consumers have expectations-based reference-
dependent preferences. Section 4 presents the main result about the sellers optimal pricing and avail-
ability with homogeneous consumers. Section 5 deals with three extensions of the baseline model:
endogenous product lines, heterogeneous consumerstastes and consumersnaïvete. Section 6 relates
the paper to the literatures on rmsresponse to consumersloss aversion, loss leaders, bait-and-switch,
price discrimination, and other topics. Section 7 concludes by recapping the results of the model and
pointing out some of its limitations as well as possible avenues for future research.
2 Evidence on Sales and Stock-Outs in Retailing
This section summarizes empirical evidence that points to three main facts: (1) sales are frequent
but a¤ect a small fraction of items, (2) products on sale are more likely to be out of stock and (3)
consumers are willing to buy substitute products when their preferred item is sold out. These facts
frame the importance and relevance of the analysis of this paper in understanding why and how retailers
use limited-availability sales, and how consumers react when facing alternatives for a product that is
sold out.
Sales, in the sense of periodic, temporary price reductions, are a ubiquitous feature of retail pricing
(see Hosken and Rei¤en, 2004a and Nakamura and Steinsson, 2008).13 However, among all the items
supermarkets and other retailers carry, usually only a small fraction each week are o¤ered at a low
sale price and, within categories, retailers seem to systematically place some products on sale more
often than others, with more popular items  those appealing to a wider range of customers  being
more likely to go on sale (Hosken and Rei¤en, 2004b). Relatedly, Nakamura (2008) nds that only a
small fraction (19%) of price variation is common to all products in a category at a given retail store.
According to a recent study by ShopAdvisor, a deferred shopping service used by independent websites
and tablet magazines, in the 54 days from Nov. 1st through Dec. 24th 2011, the day with the lowest
percentage (46%) of products on sale below their initial holiday season price was indeed Black Friday,
Nov. 25th. In fact, Black Friday is also the day on which shoppers begin to see prices spike on selected
items: on Black Friday itself, 24% of the toys on ShopAdvisors list were priced above their initial
holiday season price.14 Strausz (2007) reports that the two largest German discounters, Aldi and Lidl,
weekly advertise limited-availability bargain sales on products that do not belong to their usual selling
stock. Chevalier, Kashyap and Rossi (2003) nd that the majority of sales are not caused by changes
in wholesale pricing, implying therefore that sales are primarily due to changes in retailersmargins.
Similarly, Anderson, Nakamura, Simester and Steinsson (2012) report that while regular prices react
strongly to cost and wholesale price changes, the frequency and depth of sales is largely unresponsive.
While not as ubiquitous as sales, stockouts are also prevalent in retailing. Gruen, Corsten and
Braradwaj (2002) report an 8.3% out-of-stock rate worldwide, rising to even 25% for some promoted
items. Hess and Gerstner (1987) sampled two general merchandise stores and found that stockouts
occurred more often for products on sale than for similar products not on sale. Using data from a
13Sales might also refer to systematic reductions in the price of fashion items; see Lazear (1986), Pashigian (1988) and
Pashigian and Bowen (1991).
14See http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/shopadvisor-cautions-buyers-on-black-friday-not-worth-the-early-
morning-rise-174618581.html
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supermarket chain in Spain, Aguirregabiria (2005) documents a signicant amount of heterogeneity
across items in the frequency of stockouts; most of this heterogeneity is within-product (i.e., among
brands of the same product line) and not among products. Grant-Worley, Saltford and Zick (1982)
surveyed ve major non-food chains in Syracuse, New York and found that the average rate of unavail-
ability for advertised products was 12%. Similarly, Taylor and Fawcett (2001) investigated availability
of advertised products for three large national mass merchants, four category killers involved in the
o¢ ce supplies and electronics subcategories and three retail grocers in the Mid-West, and found that
the stock-out ratio for advertised items was twice as high as that of comparable, non-advertised items.
Bils (2004) presents evidence on temporary stockouts for durable consumer goods using data from the
CPI Commodities and Services Survey and nds that from January 1988 to June 2004 the temporary
stockout rate averaged between 8.8% and 9.2%.
Several marketing and psychology studies on consumersresponse to product unavailability (Em-
melhainz, Stock and Emmelhainz, 1991; Anupindi, Dada and Gupta, 1998; Verbeke, Farris and Thurik,
1998; Fitzsimons, 2000; Campo, Gijsbrechts and Nisol, 2000, 2003; Zinn and Liu, 2001) show that con-
sumers are often willing to buy substitute items when faced with stockouts: depending on the specic
characteristics of the product and store under study, the percentage of consumers who is willing to buy
a substitute  within the same store  ranges from 30% to 80%. Through a post-purchase question-
naire, Zinn and Liu (2001) nd also that consumers are more likely to leave a store empty-handed if
they are surprised by the stockout; this nding suggests that prior expectations of product availability
may be an important predictor of out-of-stock response. Relatedly, Anderson, Fitzsimons and Simester
(2006) and Ozcan (2008) nd that consumers are more willing to buy a substitute if the stockout prod-
uct was on sale or if limited supplies were announced up-front. Conlon and Mortimer (2011) conducted
a eld experiment by exogenously removing top-selling products from a set of vending machines and
tracking subsequent consumer responses. Their results show that most consumers purchase another
good when a top-selling product is removed. Moreover, some product removals increase the vendors
prots as consumers substitute toward products with higher margins. Ozcan (2008) ran a survey study
in a grocery store where the manager had previously agreed to create stockouts articially by removing
some items entirely from the shelves. Of all the consumers who replied to the survey saying that they
had experienced a stockout, 11% said they cancelled or postponed the purchase, 49% decided to switch
store (there are two other supermarkets within a 4 minute walking distance from the treated store),
and 40% said they bought a substitute item for the one that was not available.15
3 Model
In this section, I rst introduce the consumerspreferences and outline the timing of the interaction
between the monopolist and the consumers. Then, I describe the consumersstrategies and illustrate
the logic behind the solution concepts. I end this section with a simple example that shows how the
monopolist can achieve higher prots by strategically manipulating product availability.
15Although product availability is probably more relevant for traditional brick and mortar stores than for online retailers,
recent studies show that limited-availability sales and stockouts pertain to online shopping as well; see Breugelmans, Campo
and Gijsbrechts, (2006), Jing and Lewis (2011) and Kim and Lennon (2011).
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3.1 Environment
There is a unit mass of identical consumers whose intrinsic valuation for good i is vi, i = 1; 2.
Assume v1  v2 > 0. The goods are substitutes and each consumer is interested in buying at most one
unit of one good. The goods could be two di¤erent brands of a consumer durable, such as a household
appliance.16
Consumers have expectations-based reference-dependent preferences as formulated by K½oszegi and
Rabin (2006). In this formulation, a consumers (his) utility function has two components. First, when
buying item i at price pi, a consumer experiences consumption utility vi  pi. Consumption utility can
be thought of as the classical notion of outcome-based utility. Second, a consumer also derives utility
from the comparison of his actual consumption to a reference point given by his recent expectations
(probabilistic beliefs).17 For a riskless consumption outcome (vi; pi) and riskless expectations (evi; epi),
a consumers total utility is given by
U [(vi; pi) j (evi; epi)] = vi   pi +  (vi   evi) +  (epi   pi) (1)
where
 (x) =
(
x if x  0
x if x < 0
is gain-loss utility.
I assume  > 0 and  > 1. By positing a constant marginal utility from gains and a constant,
but larger marginal disutility from losses, this formulation captures prospect theorys (Kahneman and
Tversky 1979, Tversky and Kahneman 1991) loss aversion, but without its diminishing sensitivity. The
parameter  can be seen as the relative weight a consumer attaches to gain-loss utility, and  can be
seen as the coe¢ cient of loss aversion.
According to (1), a consumer assesses gains and losses separately over products quality and money.18
For instance, if his reference point is that he will not get the product (and thus pay nothing), then he
evaluates getting the product and paying for it as a gain in the item dimension and a loss in the money
dimension rather than as a single gain or loss depending on total consumption utility relative to his
reference point. This feature of the K½oszegi-Rabins model is what allows the monopolist to extract
more than the consumers intrinsic valuation for the good.19 Furthermore, this is consistent with much
16Alternatively, this situation can be thought as one of vertical di¤erentiation in which there are two versions of the
same item, with good 2 being the basicversion and good 1 being the advancedversion. All consumers agree on the
vertical ranking of the two goods.
17Recent experimental evidence lends support to K½oszegi and Rabins (2006, 2007) expectations-based model of
reference-dependent preferences and loss aversion; see for instance Abeler, Falk, Goette, and Hu¤man (2011), Ericson
and Fuster (2011), Gill and Prowse (2012), Karle, Kirchsteiger and Peitz (2012), Song (2012) and Sprenger (2011).
18The model of K½oszegi and Rabin (2006) assumes that the gain-loss utility function  is the same across all dimensions.
In principle, one could also allow for this function to di¤er across the item and the money dimension. For example,
Novemsky and Kahneman (2005) and K½oszegi and Rabin (2009) argue that reference dependence and loss aversion are
weaker in the money than in the item dimension.
19The other crucial feature of these preferences, which is that the reference point is determined by the decision makers
forward-looking expectations, is implicit in disappointment-aversion models of Bell (1985), Loomes and Sugden (1986),
and Gul (1991). However, because in these models gains and losses are assessed along only one dimension, the consumers
intrinsic utility (vi   pi, in this paper), they are unable to predict the type of pricing schemes that is the subject of this
paper.
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of the experimental evidence commonly interpreted in terms of loss aversion.20
Because in many situations expectations are stochastic, K½oszegi and Rabin (2006) extend the utility
function in (1) to allow for the reference point to be a pair of probability distribution F = (F v; F p) over
the two dimensions of consumption utility. In this case a consumers total utility from the outcome
(vi; pi) can be written as
U [(vi; pi) j (F v; F p)] = vi   pi +
Z
evi  (vi   evi) dF v (evi) +
Z
epi  (epi   pi) dF p (epi) (2)
In words, when evaluating (vi; pi) a consumer compares it to each possible outcome in the reference
lottery. For example, if he had been expecting to buy good 1 for $15, then buying good 2 for $10 feels
like a loss of v1 v2 on the quality dimension and a gain of $5 on the money dimension.21 Similarly, if a
consumer had been expecting to buy good 1 for either $10 or $20, then paying $15 for it feels like a loss
of $5 relative to the possibility of paying $10, and like a gain of $5 relative to the possibility of paying
$20. In addition, the weight on the loss (gain) in the overall experience is equal to the probability with
which he had been expecting to pay $10 ($20).
To complete this theory of consumer behavior with the above belief-dependent preferences, K½oszegi
and Rabin (2006) assume that beliefs must be consistent with rationality: a consumer correctly antici-
pates the implications of his plans, and makes the best plan he knows he will carry through. Notice that
any plan of behavior  which in my setting amounts simply to a price-contingent strategy of which
item to buy  induces some expectations. If, given these expectations, the consumer is not willing
to follow the plan, then he could not have rationally formulated the plan in the rst place. Hence, a
credible plan must have the property that it is optimal given the expectations it generates. Following
the original denitions in K½oszegi and Rabin (2006) and K½oszegi (2010), I call such a credible plan a
personal equilibrium (PE). If there exist multiple credible plans, a rational consumer chooses the one
that maximizes his expected utility from an ex-ante perspective. I call such a favorite credible plan a
preferred personal equilibrium (PPE).22
The seller (she) is a monopolist supplying good 1 and good 2 at a unit cost of c1  0 and c2  0,
respectively (these could be the wholesale prices). The seller does not experience economies of scale
or scope in supplying these goods. For i = 1; 2, let qi denote the amount or degree of availability of
good i o¤ered by the monopolist. If qi < 1, then good i is subject to limited availabilityso that only
a fraction qi of the consumers can purchase it. I assume that, in the event of a stockout, rationing is
proportional: each consumer has the same ex-ante probability of obtaining the good, which is allocated
to consumers on a random rst-come, rst-serve basis.23
20This feauture is able to predict the endowment e¤ect observed in many laboratory experiments (see Kahneman,
Knetsch, and Thaler 1990, 1991). The common explanation of the endowment e¤ect is that owners feel giving up the
object as a painful loss that counts more than money they receive in exchange, so that they demand a lot of money for the
object. But if gains and losses were dened over the value of the entire transaction, owners would not be more sensitive
to giving up the object than to receiving money in exchange. He¤etz and List (2011), however, nd no evidence that
expectations alone play a part in the endowment e¤ect.
21Therefore, the two goods are substitutes not only in the usual sense, but also in the sense of being evaluated along
the same hedonic dimension.
22 In the simple environment considered in this paper, a PPE always exists and is generically unique. K½oszegi (2010)
discusses conditions for existence and uniqueness of PPE in more general environments.
23Gilbert and Klemperer (2000) show that rationing can be a protable strategy if consumers must make sunk investe-
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The interaction between the monopolist and the consumers lasts two periods, 0 and 1. In period 0,
the seller announces (and commits to) a price pair (p1; p2) 2 R2+ and a quantity pair (q1; q2) 2 [0; 1]2;
after observing the sellers choice of quantities and prices, consumers pick the plan that is consistent
and that maximizes their expected utility (PPE). I assume also that consumers cannot commit ex-ante
not to go to the store. In period 1, consumers execute their purchasing plans and payments are made.
The assumption about the seller announcing both prices in period 0 is not very realistic because while
stores frequently advertise their good deals, it is rather uncommon to see a store publicizing its high
prices. However, in Appendix B I show that the main results of the paper are unchanged if the seller
commits only to the price and availability of the bargain.24 Finally, I assume that when indi¤erent
between a plan that involves buying and another plan that involves not buying, consumers always break
the indi¤erence in favor of the rst of these plans.
3.2 ConsumersDemand
Let H 2 

[0; 1]2  R2+

denote a consumers expectations, induced by the sellers strategy, about
the degree of availability and the prices he might face. For a given sellers choice of prices and degree of
availability, a consumer chooses among ve possible plans: (i) never buy,(ii) buy item 1 if available
and dont buy otherwise, (iii) buy item 2 if available and dont buy otherwise, (iv) buy item 1 if
available and otherwise buy item 2 if availableand (v) buy item 2 if available and otherwise buy item
1 if available.25 Let  2 ff?g ; f1;?g ; f2;?g ; f1; 2g ; f2; 1gg denote a consumers plan and let  H;
denote the distribution over nal consumption outcomes induced jointly by H and . In a personal
equilibrium the behavior generating expectations must be optimal given the expectations:
Denition 1  is a Personal Equilibrium (PE) if
U [j H;]  U

0j H;

for any 0 6= .
Utility maximization in period 0 implies that the consumer chooses the PE plan that maximizes his
expected utility:
Denition 2  is a Preferred Personal Equilibrium (PPE) if it is a PE and
EU H; [j H;]  EU H;0

0j H;0

for any 0 such that 0 is a PE.
ments to enter the market, and Nocke and Peitz (2007) show that rationing across periods can be protable in a model of
intertemporal monopoly pricing under demand uncertainty.
24Since consumers have rational expectations, they would correctly infer the price of the rip-o¤ even if it was not publicly
advertised.
25Mixing between plans on the consumersside can easily be ruled out by the fact that the seller would never choose a
price-pair inducing a buyer to buy with probability less than 1.
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In the remainder of this section, I analyze the conditions for when plans (i), (ii) and (iv) constitute a
PE or a PPE.26 This allows me to both illustrate the logic of PE and PPE, as well as to start developing
the intuition for my main result on the optimality of limited-availability schemes. Specically, a central
element of the sellers strategy is to make sure that plan (i) is not a PE and I start by analyzing
conditions for this.
Conditions for plan (i) to be a PE For never buying to be a PE, the consumer must expect
not to buy. In this case his reference point is to consume nothing and pay nothing. Let the price of
good 1 be p1 and suppose the consumer sticks to his plan. Then, his overall utility is
U [(0; 0) j f?g] = 0:
What if instead the consumer decides to deviate from his plan and buys item 1? In this case his
overall utility is
U [(v1; p1) j f?g] = v1   p1 + v1   p1,
where v1   p1 is his intrinsic consumption utility from buying item 1 at price p1, v1 is the gain he
feels from consuming item 1 when he was expecting to consume nothing, and  p1 captures the loss
he feels from paying p1 when he was expecting to pay nothing. Thus, the consumer will not deviate in
this way from the plan to never buy if
U [(0; 0) j f?g] > U [(v1; p1) j f?g], p1 > 1 + 
1 + 
v1.
A similar threshold can be derived for the case in which the consumer considers deviating from
his original plan and buy item 2 at price p2. Therefore, the plan to never buy is a PE if and only if
p1 >
1+
1+v1  pmin1 and p2 > 1+1+v2 = pmin2 because otherwise the consumers would not follow through
their intended plan of not buying. The expected utility associated with the plan to never buy is
EU [f?g j f?g] = 0
as the expected utility from planning to consume nothing and pay nothing and expecting to follow this
plan is of course zero.
Therefore, if either p1  pmin1 or p2  pmin2 plan (i) cannot be a PE and consumers must select a
plan that involves buying at least one item with positive probability. As I will show in the next section,
it turns out that (unsurprisingly) it is optimal for the seller to induce consumers to select plan (iv)
and thus to expect to never leave the store empty-handed whenever an item is available; however, (less
obviously) it is not optimal for that to be the only PE plan. Hence, the seller would like the consumer
to prefer plan (iv) over plan (ii) ex-ante.
Conditions for plan (ii) to be a PE Suppose a buyer enters the store expecting to buy item
1 if available and not to buy otherwise. In this case his reference point on the product dimension is
to enjoy v1 with probability q1 and to consume nothing with probability 1  q1; similarly, on the price
26The relevant conditions for plans (iii) and (v) are analogous to the ones for plans (ii) and (iv), respectively; hence, I
do not show them here.
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dimension he expects to pay p1 with probability q1 and to pay nothing with probability 1  q1. If the
consumer follows this plan his realized utility if item 1 is indeed available is
U [(v1; p1) j f1;?g] = v1   p1 +  (1  q1) v1    (1  q1) p1,
where v1 p1 is his intrinsic consumption utility from buying item 1 at price p1,  (1  q1) v1 is the gain
he feels from consuming item 1 when he was expecting to consume nothing with probability 1   q1,
and   (1  q1) p1 is the loss he feels from paying p1 when he was expecting to pay nothing with
probability 1   q1. Suppose that item 1 is available but the buyer instead deviates and does not buy.
In this case his overall utility is
U [(0; 0) j f1;?g] = 0  q1v1 + q1p1,
where 0 is his intrinsic consumption utility,  q1v1 is the loss he feels from consuming nothing when
he was expecting to consume item 1 with probability q1, and q1p1 is the gain from paying nothing
instead of p1 which he was expecting to pay with probability q1. Thus, the consumer will not deviate
in this way from his plan if
U [(v1; p1) j f1;?g]  U [(0; 0) j f1;?g], p1  1 +  (1  q1) + q1
1 + q1 +  (1  q1)v1: (3)
Next, consider the case in which item 1 is not available. If the buyer follows his plan, his overall
utility is U [(0; 0) j f1;?g]. If instead he deviates and buys item 2, for p1  p2 his overall utility is
U [(v2; p2) j f1;?g] = v2   p2 +  (1  q1) v2   q1 (v1   v2) + q1 (p1   p2)   (1  q1) p2,
where v2 p2 is the intrinsic consumption utility from buying item 2 at price p2,  (1  q1) v2 is the gain
he feels from consuming item 2 compared to the expectation of consuming nothing with probability
(1  q1),  q1 (v1   v2) is the loss he feels from consuming item 2 instead of item 1 when he was
expecting to consume item 1 with probability q1 (recall that v1  v2), q1 (p1   p2) is the gain from
paying p2 instead of p1 which he was expecting to pay with probability q1, and   (1  q1) p2 is the
loss from paying p2 when he was expecting to pay nothing with probability 1  q1. Thus, the consumer
will not deviate in this way from his plan if
U [(0; 0) j f1;?g] > U [(v2; p2) j f1;?g], p2 > 1 +  (1  q1) + q1
1 + q1 +  (1  q1)v2. (4)
Notice that conditions (3) and (4) together imply that U [(v1; p1) j f1;?g] > U [(v2; p2) j f1;?g],
so that there is no need to check that a consumer does not want to deviate and buy item 2 when
item 1 is available. Therefore, for p1  p2, f1;?g is a PE if and only if p2 > 1+(1 q)+q1+q+(1 q)v2 and
p1  1+(1 q)+q1+q+(1 q)v1. Similarly, for p1 < p2, f1;?g is a PE if and only if p1 < 1+(1 q1)+q11+q1+(1 q1)v1 and
p2 >
v2[1+(1 q1)+q1]+q1( 1)p1
1+ . The expected utility associated with this plan is
EU [f1;?g j f1;?g] = q1 (v1   p1)  q1 (1  q1)  (  1) (v1 + p1) . (5)
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The rst term in (5), q1 (v1   p1), is standard expected consumption utility. The second term,
 q1 (1  q1)  (  1) (v1 + p1) ; is expected gain-loss utility and it is derived as follows. On the product
dimension, the consumer compares the outcome in which with probability q1 he consumes item 1 and
enjoys v1 with the outcome in which with probability 1  q1 he does not consume and gets 0. Similarly,
on the price dimension he compares paying price p1 with probability q1 with paying 0 with probability
1  q1. Notice that the expected gain-loss utility is always negative as, since  > 1, losses are felt more
heavily than equal-size gains. Also, notice that uncertainty in the product and uncertainty in money
are added upso that the expected gain-loss term is proportional to v1 + p1.
Conditions for Plan (iv) to be a PE For the plan to buy item 1 if available and otherwise
buy item 2, a consumers reference point in the product dimension is to consume item 1 and enjoy v1
with probability q1, to consume item 2 and enjoy v2 with probability q2 and to consume nothing with
probability 1  q1  q2; similarly, in the price dimension, a consumer expects to pay p1 with probability
q1, p2 with probability q2 and to pay nothing with probability 1  q1   q2. Then, if he follows his plan
and buys item 1, for p1  p2, his realized utility is
U [(v1; p1) j f1; 2g] = v1   p1 + q2 (v1   v2) +  (1  q1   q2) v1   q2 (p1   p2)   (1  q1   q2) p1:
If instead he deviates and buys item 2, his utility is
U [(v2; p2) j f1; 2g] = v2   p2   q1 (v1   v2) +  (1  q1   q2) v2 + q1 (p1   p2)   (1  q1   q2) p2:
Thus, the consumer will not deviate in this way from his plan if
U [(v1; p1) j f1; 2g]  U [(v2; p2) j f1; 2g], p1  p2 + 1 +  (1  q1) + q1
1 + q1 +  (1  q1) (v1   v2) : (6)
Suppose now that once a consumer arrives at the store, item 2 is everything that is left. If he follows
his plan and buys item 2 his overall utility is U [(v2; p2) j f1; 2g]. If instead he deviates and does not
buy his utility is
U [(0; 0) j f1; 2g] = 0  q1v1   q2v2 + q1p1 + q2p2:
Thus, the consumer will not deviate in this way from his plan if
U [(v2; p2) j f1; 2g]  U [(0; 0) j f1; 2g], p2  1 +  (q1 + q2) +  (1  q1   q2)
1 +  (q1 + q2) +  (1  q1   q2)v2. (7)
Notice that conditions (6) and (7) together imply that U [(v1; p1) j f1; 2g] > U [(0; 0) j f1; 2g]. Hence,
for p1  p2, f1; 2g is a PE if and only if p1  p2+1+(1 q1)+q11+q1+(1 q1) (v1   v2) and p2 
1+(q1+q2)+(1 q1 q2)
1+(q1+q2)+(1 q1 q2)v2.
Similarly, for p1 < p2, f1; 2g is a PE if and only if p2  1+(q1+q2)+(1 q1 q2)1+q2+(1 q2) v2 +
( 1)q1
1+q2+(1 q2)p1.
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The expected utility associated with this plan is
EU [f1; 2g j f1; 2g] = q1 (v1   p1) + q2 (v2   p2) (8)
 q1 (1  q1   q2)  (  1) (v1 + p1)
 q2 (1  q1   q2)  (  1) (v2 + p2)
 q1q2 (  1) (v1   v2)
 q1q2 (  1) (max fp1; p2g  min fp1; p2g) .
The rst and second terms in (8), q1 (v1   p1) + q2 (v2   p2), are the standard expected consump-
tion utility terms. The third term, q1 (1  q1   q2)  (  1) (v1 + p1), is always negative and captures
expected gain-loss utility in both the product and the money dimensions from comparing the outcome
in which the consumer buys item 1 and pays p1 with the outcome of returning home empty-handed.
Similarly, the fourth term captures expected gain-loss utility in both dimensions from comparing the
outcome of buying item 2 at price p2 with the outcome of returning home empty-handed. The fth
term,  q1q2 (  1) (v1   v2), captures expected gain-loss utility in the consumption dimension when
comparing the two outcomes in which he buys something: with probability q1 the consumer expects to
buy good 1 and with probability q2 he expects to buy good 2. Notice again that this term is negative,
but it is proportional to (v1   v2). This is because with this plan, the consumer is guaranteeinghim-
self to enjoy at least the item he values v2 and the expected gain-loss utility is therefore related only to
by how much more he would prefer to consume the other good (or, the degree of substitutability be-
tween the two goods). The sixth term,  q1q2 (  1) (max fp1; p2g  min fp1; p2g), captures expected
gain-loss utility in the money dimension when comparing the two outcomes in which he buys and can
be explained in a similar fashion.
Conditions for Plan (iv) to be the PPE Suppose that p1  p2. When both plan (ii) and (iv)
are Personal Equilibria, a consumer will select plan (iv) rather than plan (ii) if and only if
EU [f1; 2g j f1; 2g]  EU [f1;?g j f1;?g], v2   p2   (  1) (1  2q1   q2) (v2 + p2) : (9)
Similarly, for p1 < p2 a consumer will select plan (iv) rather than plan (ii) if and only if
v2   p2  (1  q2)  (  1) (v2 + p2)  2q1 (  1) (v2 + p1) : (10)
Notice, crucially, that conditions (9) and (10) might hold even if p2 > v2. Therefore, a consumer
might prefer, from an ex-ante perspective, to plan to always buy even if p2 > v2. This happens because,
by planning to always buy, the consumer is essentially insuring himself against extreme uctuations in
his consumption outcome.27
27More generally, as shown in K½oszegi and Rabin (2007), a decisionmaker with expectations-based loss aversion dislikes
uncertainty in consumption utility because he dislikes the possibility of a resulting loss more than he likes the possibility
of a resulting gain.
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3.3 An Illustrative Example
Consider a monopolist supplying two goods, 1 and 2, to a unit mass of consumers who have
expectations-based reference-dependent preferences with  = 1 and  = 3. Let v1 = v, v2 = 23v,
c1 =
3
5v and c2 =
v
3 . If she had to provide full availability, the seller would supply only item 1 and price
it at v, obtaining a prot of 25v.
Consider instead the following limited-availability scheme: q1 = 14 , q2 =
3
4 , p1 =
v
2 and p2 = v. Since
p1 < p
min
1 , it is not a PE for consumers to never buy: the price of item 1 is so low that if consumers
had planned not to buy it, then if item 1 is indeed available, they would like to surprise themselves and
buy it, and since the price is very low, the gain on the item dimension more than outweighs the loss on
the money dimension.
The plan to buy item 1 if available and nothing otherwise is a PE because p1 < 57v1 and p2 >
5v2+p1
8 . Intuitively, if consumers enter the store with the expectation of consuming item 1 with positive
probability and item 1 is available, they are willing to follow their plan since the price of item 1 is
relatively low compared to its intrinsic value; however, they are not willing to buy item 2 if they were
not expecting to do so, since the price of item 2 is relatively high compared to its intrinsic value.
Similarly, the plan to buy item 1 if available and item 2 otherwise is a PE because p2 <
8v2+p1
5 .
The intuition is that, by planning to always buy something, consumers expect to enjoy at least v2 for
sure; because of this attachment e¤ect, therefore, they are willing to buy item 2 if they were expecting
to do so even if its price is relatively high. Furthermore, this plan is the PPE since
EU [f1; 2g j f1; 2g] = 1
4

v   v
2

+
3
4

2
3
v   v

  9
16

v
3
+
v
2

>
1
4

v   v
2

  9
16

v +
v
2

= EU [f1;?g j f1;?g] :
The reason why, from an ex-ante point of view, consumers prefer the plan to always buy is that this
plan reduces the magnitude of the uctuations of their consumption outcomes and, therefore, makes
them subject to a smaller expected gain-loss disutility. Finally, notice that with this limited-availability
scheme the sellers prot equals 1940v, which is higher than the prot under full availability.
This example illustrates already many of the key insights of the general model. First, with a limited-
availability scheme the seller is able to obtain a higher prot than what she can obtain with perfect
availability. The prices of the bargain and the rip-o¤ are chosen by the seller in a way such that (i)
not buying is not a PE for the consumers and (ii) planning to always buy is the consumersPPE.
Furthermore, the superior item is chosen as the bargain and it is priced below its marginal cost. The
purpose of the next section is to formalize and generalize these insights.
4 Optimal Availability and Pricing
In this section I derive the sellers prot-maximizing schemes. I divide the analysis in two cases. In
the rst sub-section, I consider the case of close substitutes. I dene two goods to be close substitutes
if the two following conditions hold both:
(i) v2 >

1+
2++

v1;
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(ii) v2 >
p
v1(1+)[2(c1 c2)(22 2+2 +1)+v1(1+)] ( 1)(1+)v1
22 2+2 +1 .
The rst condition ensures that the price of the superior product, when this is the rip-o¤, is higher
under limited availability than under perfect availability. The second condition ensures that the price of
the rip-o¤ is higher than the price of the bargain, even when the inferior product is used as the rip-o¤.
I show that when the products are close substitutes, the sellers prot-maximizing limited-availability
scheme entails prices being farther away than valuations.
In the second sub-section, I consider the case of distant substitutes  when either condition (i)
or (ii) fails  and I show that in this case the seller always uses the superior product as a bargain.
Moreover, when the products are distant substitutes, the sellers prot-maximizing limited-availability
scheme encompasses prices being less dispersed than valuations.
4.1 Close Substitutes
For given prices (p1; p2) and quantities(q1; q2), the monopolists prot is
 (p1; p2; q; c1; c2) = q1 (p1   c1) + q2 (p2   c2) :
If consumers were not loss-averse, the prot-maximizing strategy for the seller would be to just set
pi = vi, for i = 1; 2, and q1 = 1 (resp. q2 = 1) if v1  c1  v2  c2 (resp. if v1  c1 < v2  c2). Consumers
would get zero surplus and the sellers prot would be exactly v1   c1 (resp. v2   c2).
The rst lemma of this section shows that with loss-averse consumers, if restricted to supply one
good with certainty, the above mentioned strategy remains the monopolists prot-maximizing one.28
Lemma 1 With perfect availability the monopolist cannot extract more than v1 from the consumers.
In general, however, this strategy need not be the prot-maximizing one when consumers are loss-
averse as the seller instead can achieve a higher prot by reducing the availability of some goods and
thus inducing uncertainty into the buyersplans.
The next lemma states that even though she might reduce the degree of availability of some goods,
it is in the sellers best interest that all consumers get to buy a good for sure, and the uncertainty
is only about which good they will buy.29 The intuition for this result relies on the sellers intent to
mitigate the comparison e¤ectand simultaneously magnify the attachment e¤ectfor the consumers
(K½oszegi and Rabin, 2006). An increase in the likelihood of buying increases a consumers sense of loss
if he does not buy, creating an attachment e¤ectthat increases his willingness to pay. On the other
hand, for a xed probability of buying, a decrease in the price a consumer expects to pay makes paying
a higher price feel like more of a loss, creating a comparison e¤ectthat lowers his willingness to pay
the high price.
Lemma 2 The market is fully covered: q1 + q2 = 1.
28All proofs are relegated to Appendix A.
29A similar result is provided by Pavlov (2011) and Balestrieri and Leao (2011) for the case of a monopolist selling
substitutes to risk-neutral consumers.
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With q1+q2 = 1, if a consumer plans to always buy, he is guaranteed to get at least the less preferred
item (v2) and thus he is not exposed anymore to the possibility of returning home empty-handed; this
increases the consumers willingness to pay through the attachment e¤ect. At the same time, because
the possibility of buying nothing has disappeared, the consumer expects to always spend some money;
this also increases the consumers willingness to pay through reducing the comparison e¤ect.
Given Lemma 2, from this point forward I am going to use q and 1  q to denote the quantities of
good 1 and 2, respectively. The lemma below shows that with limited availability, the monopolist must
o¤er at least one good at a discounted price.
Lemma 3 If q 2 (0; 1) then either p1 < v1 or p2 < v2.
With limited availability, a consumer faces uncertainty about his consumption outcome before
arriving at the store and because losses are felt more heavily than gains, if he expects to buy with
positive probability, his expected gain-loss utility is negative. Therefore, for a consumer to be willing
to plan to buy, the seller must guarantee him a strictly positive intrinsic surplus on at least one item,
otherwise he would be better o¤ by planning to not buy and this plan would be consistent for p1  v1
and p2  v2.
Having established that the monopolist can sell a strictly positive quantity of both goods only if one
of them is priced at a discount, the next question is how big this discount must be. The next lemma
states that the seller must o¤er a bargain on this good; in other words, its price must be so low that it
is not credible for consumers to plan on not buying.
Lemma 4 If q 2 (0; 1) the seller chooses prices such that the plan to never buy is not a PE.
Since, for a given product i, the highest price the seller can charge to make not buying a non credible
plan is pmini  1+1+vi, then it must be that if the seller is producing both goods in strictly positive
quantity, one of them is priced at this forcing price.30
What about the price of the other item? If she produces a strictly positive quantity of both goods,
the seller wants the buyers to plan to always buy. However, as the lemma below shows, it is not optimal
for the seller to choose the other price such that always buying is the unique consistent plan. Instead,
the optimal price pair is such that consumers are indi¤erent, ex-ante, between the plan of always buying
and the plan of buying only the bargain item.
Lemma 5 For q 2 (0; 1), if the seller uses item 2 as the bargain (i.e., p2 = pmin2 ), then the optimal
price for item 1 is
p1 = v1 +
2 (1  q)  (  1) [v2 (2 +  + )  v1 (1 + )]
(1 + ) [1 +  (  1) (1  q)] > v1:
If instead she uses item 1 as the bargain (i.e., p1 = pmin1 ), then the optimal price for item 2 is
p2 = v2 +
2qv1 (  1) (1 + )
(1 + ) [1 +  (  1) q] > v2:
30This result is akin to the single-product one in Heidhues and K½oszegi (forthcoming) from whom I borrowed the term
forcing price.
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This last lemma implies that consumers are willing to pay a premium, in the form of a higher
price on the item that is not on sale (and therefore in the form of a higher expected expenditure), to
avoid ex-ante the disappointment of leaving the store empty-handed. Furthermore, pi is the highest
price such that consumers (weakly) prefer, from an ex-ante point of view, the plan of buying item j if
available and item i otherwise to the plan of buying item j if available and nothing otherwise, when
item j is sold at its forcing price.To gain intuition on why a consumer might nd it optimal to plan
to buy at pi > vi, suppose the seller uses item 1 as the bargain, by pricing it at pmin1 . If a consumer
plans to buy only item 1 and nothing otherwise his expected utility is equal to
q

v1   pmin1

   (  1) q (1  q)

v1 + p
min
1

:
While the term relating to consumption utility in the above expression is strictly positive, the
expected gain-loss utility term is strictly negative. If instead the consumer plans to always buy, then
his expected utility is
q

v1   pmin1

+ (1  q) (v2   p2)   (  1) q (1  q)

v1   v2 + p2   pmin1

:
In the above expression the expected gain-loss utility is still negative, but now its magnitude is 
v1   v2 + p2   pmin1

.31 Therefore, as long as p2   v2 < 2pmin1 , by planning to always buy a consumer
is subject to a smaller expected gain-loss disutility and this allows the seller to raise p2 above v2.
Furthermore, the closer v2 is to v1, the more freedom the seller has in raising p2; implying that dispersion
in prices and dispersion in valuations are inversely related.
Both rip-o¤ prices p1 and p2 are increasing in the degree of availability of their respective bargain
item  1  q and q  implying that the attachment e¤ect (see K½oszegi and Rabin, 2006 and Heidhues
and K½oszegi, forthcoming) carries over to the case of multiple goods evaluated along the same hedonic
dimension.
Similarly, notice that @p

i
@vj
> 0, for i; j = 1; 2, i 6= j. Thus, expectations-based loss aversion produces
a kind of positive demand spillover across products, despite these being substitutes. Indeed, both p1
and p2 are written as the sum of two components: the direct e¤ect, which simply equals the consumers
intrinsic valuation for the product, and the spillover e¤ect due to loss aversion. Notice that while the
spillover e¤ect for p2 depends only on v1 and is increasing in it, the spillover e¤ect for p1 depends
both on v1 and v2 and is increasing in the former and decreasing in the latter. Intuitively, increasing
consumersintrinsic value for item 1 makes item 2 is not such a good substitute for it. This, however,
does not a¤ect p2 because when item 1 is the bargain, a higher v1 increases consumersexpected gain-
loss disutility when planning to buy only the bargain and when planning to always buy by the same
amount.
Having derived the optimal prices for the bargain and the rip-o¤, the next step for the seller is
to choose the optimal degree of availability for each item. For example, consider the case in which
the seller uses item 2 as the bargain. Then, she is going to choose the q that solves the following
31The second condition about close substitutability ensures that p2   pmin1 > 0.
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maximization problem:
max
q
q (p1   c1) + (1  q)

pmin2   c2

.
The rst-order condition yields
p1   c1  

pmin2   c2

+ q
@p1
@q
= 0: (11)
Notice that q @p

1
@q < 0 because of the attachment e¤ect: the higher the degree of availability of
the bargain, the more optimistic the consumers beliefs about making a deal. This in turn, allows
the seller to charge a higher mark-up on the rip-o¤. On the other hand, a greater availability of the
bargain necessarily means fewer sales of the rip-o¤ and hence reduces the sellers prots, as captured
by p1   c1  
 
pmin2   c2

> 0. At the optimal degree of availability these two e¤ects o¤set each other.
Lemma 6 If the seller uses item 2 as the bargain, the optimal degree of availability of item 1 is
q = arg max
q

 
p1; pmin2 ; q; c1; c2

, with q 2

1
2 ; 1

. If instead she uses item 1 as the bargain, the optimal
degree of availability of item 1 is q = arg max
q

 
pmin1 ; p

2; q; c1; c2

, and q 2

0; 12

if v2   c2  v1   c1
or if v2   c2 < v1   c1 and   1. Furthermore, q > 1  q.
When the bargain is the product with the lower social surplus, the seller always supplies more units
of the rip-o¤ item than the bargain. So, even if a high degree of availability for the bargain allows her,
via the attachment e¤ect, to increase the price of the rip-o¤, the e¤ect is not strong enough for the
seller to be willing to sell the bargain more often than the rip-o¤. This can be seen most easily when
the two items are perfect substitutes (v1 = v2 = v) and have zero costs. In this case, (11) reduces to:
1 +
2 (  1) (1  q)
1 +  (  1) (1  q)
1 + 
1 + 
=
1 + 
1 + 
+
2 (  1) q
[1 +  (  1) (1  q)]2
1 + 
1 + 
: (12)
The left-hand-side of (12) captures the sellers marginal gain from an increase in q; similarly, the
right-hand-side captures the sellers marginal loss. The following is necessary for (12) to hold:
2 (  1) q
[1 +  (  1) (1  q)]2 >
2 (  1) (1  q)
1 +  (  1) (1  q)
, q
1  q > 1 +  (  1) (1  q) :
The above inequality can be satised only for q > 12 . Then, for vi  ci > vj   cj , i; j 2 f1; 2g, i 6= j
if item j is the bargain it follows
pi   ci > vi   ci > vj   cj > pminj   cj ,
so that the sellers margins on the two items are even further apart if the items are not perfect substitutes
and have di¤erent costs. Hence, the seller wants to reduce the availability of the bargain below 12 even
more.
On the other hand, suppose that v2   c2 < v1   c1 but the seller uses item 1 as the bargain (as
shown in the lemma below, this can be a prot-maximizing strategy for the seller). In this case we have
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that p2 > v2 and pmin1 < v1, yet the di¤erence p2   c2  
 
pmin1   c1

could be relatively small. Then,
as  tends to 1 pmin1 approaches v1 and for  > 1 the attachment e¤ect could be strong enough for the
seller to choose q > 12 .
Furthermore, as q > 1 q, the seller chooses a higher degree of availability for the bargain when this
is the superior item. Intuitively, when the seller uses the superior item as the bargain, some consumers
will end up paying a very high price for the item they like the least; in order to convince them to do
so, the seller must compensate the consumers with a higher ex-ante chance of making a deal.
The above analysis does not specify which item the seller would prefer to use as the bargain. To
determine whether the seller would prefer to use item 1 or 2, we must compare her prots in the two
cases. Unfortunately, these are complex non-linear functions of v1 and v2, which are di¢ cult to sign even
in the simplest cases and are intractable in general. To overcome this di¢ culty, I employ comparative
statics techniques based on the envelope theorem; but the downside of this approach is that some of
the results in the following lemma apply only for small changes in the relevant parameters.32
Lemma 7 If the two goods are perfect substitutes (i.e., v1 = v2) the seller prefers to use as the bargain
the one with the higher marginal cost and is indi¤erent if the two goods have the same marginal cost
(i.e., c1 = c2). For v1 > v2, the seller uses item 2 as the bargain only if v1 c1 +c2 > v2 > 2(1+)(c1 c2)1+2
and v1  ev1, where ev1 is implicitly dened by:"
1   (  1) (1  q)
1 +  (  1) (1  q)q  
1 + 
1 + 
q  

1  q
 1 + 
1 + 
2q (  1)
1 + q (  1)
#
(v1   v2) 

q   q

(c1   c2) .
Otherwise, she prefers using item 1 as the bargain.
So, if v1   c1  v2   c2, the seller always uses item 1 as the bargain. Arguably more interesting,
however, is the fact that the seller might prefer to use item 1 as the bargain even when this is the item
with the greater social surplus (i.e., v1   c1 > v2   c2). The intuition for this result can be seen in
two steps. First, as v1 > v2 it follows that pmin1 > p
min
2 and this in turn implies that p

2

q

> p1 (q)
through both the attachment e¤ect and the comparison e¤ect. So both prices are higher when the
seller uses item 1 as the bargain. However, from this we cannot yet conclude that the sellers revenue
is higher when she supplies item 1 at a discount because the weights, q and q, are di¤erent. Indeed,
we know from lemma 6 that the seller supplies more units of the rip-o¤ when this is the superior good.
Nevertheless, for v1  v2 small enough the di¤erence in the weights is a second-order one and the seller
prefers to use item 1 as the bargain even if c1 = c2. Second, if c2 < c1, by using the superior item as
the bargain, the seller is able to reduce her average marginal cost by more, compared to the case in
which she uses item 2 as the bargain.
Figure 1 shows how the protability of di¤erent schemes changes with v1 for the case in which
v1   c1 > v2   c2 and the di¤erence in marginal costs is small. The black line represents the sellers
prots when supplying only item 1 at price p1 = v1, whereas the green and red curves depict the sellers
prots with limited availability when either item 1 or 2 is used as the bargain item, respectively (notice
that the sellers overall prot is given by the upper envelope of these three curves). Concerning the
32The results apply only for small changes because comparative statics techniques linearize prots around the maximum.
Klemperer and Padilla (1997) use the same approach in a similar context.
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choice of the bargain item, in the graph we can distinguish three di¤erent regions, delimited by the two
dashed vertical lines. For relatively low values of v1, the prot-maximizing strategy for the seller is to
use a limited-availability deal and use item 1 as the bargain. As v1 increases, the di¤erence between the
green and the red curve becomes smaller and eventually the two cross. Then, for intermediate values
of v1; the seller maximizes prots by using item 2 as the bargain item. Finally, for high values of v1
the seller prefers to supply just item 1 and price it at its intrinsic value.
80 90 100
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80
90
p
v1
Figure 1: Prots as a function of v1, for  = 1,  = 3, v2 = 80, c1 = 12, c2 = 10.
When the di¤erence in marginal costs is larger, however, the seller prefers to use item 1 as the
bargain item for low as well as intermediate values of v1. This is shown in Figure 2 where the green
curve is always above the red one. In this case item 1 is more valuable to the consumer and it has a
larger social surplus; yet it is never used as a rip-o¤ item.
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Figure 2: Prots as a function of v1, for  = 1,  = 3, v2 = 80, c1 = 20, c2 = 10.
The following proposition, which constitutes the main result of this section, identies the necessary
and su¢ cient conditions for a limited-availability scheme to be prot-maximizing.
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Proposition 1 Fix any  > 0 and  > 1. The sellers prot-maximizing strategy is as follows:
(i) for v1  v2   c2 + c1 there exists a  (v2; c1; c2; ; ) such that if v1   the seller uses item 1 as
the bargain and item 2 as the rip-o¤, and if v1 <  she supplies only item 2;
(ii) for ev1 > v1 > v2   c2 + c1 there exists a  (v2; c1; c2; ; ) such that if v1   the seller uses item 1
as the bargain and item 2 as the rip-o¤, and if v1 >  she supplies only item 1;
(iii) for v1 > ev1 there exists a  (v1; c1; c2; ; ) such that if v2   the seller uses item 2 as the bargain
and item 1 as the rip-o¤, and if v2 <  she supplies only item 1.
Furthermore,  (p1; p2; q; c1; c2)  max fv1   c1; v2   c2g and the inequality is strict if both items are
supplied.
The exact expressions for ;  and  are derived in the proof of the proposition in Appendix A.
What they imply is that, if the two goods are close substitutes, the sellers prot-maximizing strategy
consists of luring the consumers with a tempting discount on one good which is available only in limited
supply (pmini < vi) and cashing in with a high price on the other (p

j > vj). Moreover, by o¤ering both
products and inducing uncertainty into the buyersplans through this type of limited-availability deals,
the seller is able to achieve a prot higher than max fv1   c1; v2   c2g.
The limited-availability scheme described in Proposition 1 cannot be rationalized by introducing
a shopping (or search) cost into a model where consumers have traditionally assumed reference-free
preferences. The reason is that, although shopping (or search) costs that are sunk once the consumers
reach the store induce an ex-post boost in consumerswillingness to pay, this boost (i) is independent
of a goods intrinsic consumption value, (ii) is always smaller than the intrinsic value itself  otherwise
consumers would not go to the store, even if the price were to be zero  and, crucially, (iii) because
randomization does not a¤ect a risk-neutral consumers reservation utility, any prot the seller can
achieve with randomization could be also achieved with a single price.33 Therefore, in this case the
seller would simply supply the product with the larger social surplus and price it at its intrinsic value
minus the shopping (or search) cost.
It is possible for the seller to nd this limit-availability strategy prot-maximizing even if the bargain
is a loss leader, as the following example shows.
Example 3 (Loss Leader) Let  = 1,  = 3, v1 = 60, v2 = 40, c1 = 35 and c2 = 22. For these
parameters values the seller prot-maximizing strategy is given by: q = 3
p
5p
83
  12 , pmin1 = 30 and
p2 =
200q+40
2q+1 = 59: 26. Item 1 is used as a loss leader and the sellers prot is 27: 27.
By combining the results in Proposition 1 with the condition for the bargain item to be a loss leader
(i.e., pmini < ci) we immediately obtain the following result.
Corollary 1 Item 1 is a loss leader if either 1+1+ c1 > v1   or v1 < min
n
1+
1+

c1; 
o
: Similarly,
item 2 is a loss leader if 1+1+ c2 > v2  :
33 If consumers are risk-averse in the sense of Expected Utility Theory, then randomization in prices yields always lower
prots than committing to a single price since consumers must be compensated for the ex-ante risk they face about the
price.
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As shown by Ambrus and Weinstein (2008), classical models of consumers behavior can rationalize
the use of loss leaders when the goods are complements but not when they are substitutes. The reason is
that with classical preferences a store might benet from using a loss-leading strategy only if consumers
buy other items together with the loss leader. In my model, instead, the presence of loss leaders still
attracts consumers into the store but, because the loss-leading product is in shortage, in equilibrium
some consumers end up buying a di¤erent, more expensive product.
Despite the consumers being homogeneous in terms of tastes for both items, the bargains and rip-
o¤s strategy described above endogenously separates them. Some consumers end up purchasing the
good that is o¤ered at a discount, making a bargain indeed. Others, instead, end up purchasing the
other good and paying for it even more than their intrinsic valuation. The next result shows that in
expectation consumers are hurt by this strategy.
Proposition 2 For any  > 0 and  > 1 a consumers expected surplus is at most zero and therefore
he would be better o¤ if he could commit to a strategy of never buying rather than following through his
actual equilibrium strategy of always buying.
As with the similar result obtained in Heidhues and K½oszegi (forthcoming), Proposition 2 suggests
that rmssales are manipulativein the sense that they lead the consumers to go to the store even
though ex-ante they would prefer not to. Consumers enter the store with the expectations  induced
by the seller  of making a bargain by purchasing a good on sale and then might end up buying
something else at an even higher price. Of course, this rather extreme result relies on the assumption
that the seller knows the consumers preferences perfectly. Nevertheless, Proposition 7 below shows
that even with consumer heterogeneity, some consumers who buy would be better o¤ making and
following through a plan of never buying. Notice also that the assumption about the seller being able
to credibly commit in advance to a given degree of availability is crucial. In fact, she has a strong
incentive to always claim, ex-post, that the bargain item is sold-out and to try to sell only the rip-
o¤. Having rational expectations, however, the consumers would correctly anticipate this and would
never plan to buy to begin with and this plan would be consistent. Hence, the current FTC Guides
Against Bait Advertising, by allowing to advertise limited-availability deals, provide the stores exactly
with the commitment power they need to implement this exploitative scheme. Abolishing the role
of limited-supply claims as a disclaimer for bait-and-switch or mandating retailers to issue rainchecks
when advertised products are out of stock, would therefore improve consumerswelfare.
In addition to the consumers being worse o¤ with limited availability, the monopolists product line
is sub-optimal:
Remark 1 With limited availability, if v1   c1 6= v2   c2, the monopolists prot-maximizing product
mix di¤ers from the socially optimal one.
Therefore, except for the non-generic case in which the two goods contribute equally to social
surplus (v1   c1 = v2   c2), by employing a limited-availability strategy, the seller is reducing welfare
compared to rst-best, according to which only the item with the larger social value should be supplied.
The monopolist, however, can make matters even worse and bring into the market a socially wasteful
product, as the following examples show.
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Example 4 (Wasteful Product 1) Let  = 1,  = 3, v1 = 20, v2 = 15, c1 = 21 and c2 = 10. For
these parameters values the seller prot-maximizing strategy is given by: q =
p
15 3
6 , p
min
1 = 10 and
p2 =
70q+15
2q+1 = 35  4
p
15 for a total prot of 6:52.
Example 5 (Wasteful Product 2) Let  = 1,  = 3, v1 = 30, v2 = 24, c1 = 28 and c2 = 25. For
these parametersvalues the seller prot-maximizing strategy is given by: q =
p
105 7
14 , p
min
1 = 15 and
p2 =
108q+24
2q+1 = 54  2
p
105 for a total prot of 3:52.
In fact, none of the results required vi > ci, i 2 f1; 2g. The intuition in Example 4 is that, albeit
socially wasteful, item 1 is highly valuable to the consumers and this makes it an ideal candidate for a
bait. The intuition is somewhat di¤erent for Example 5 because the seller is now introducing an item
that is socially wasteful as well as inferior for the consumers; the key here is that item 2 has a lower
marginal cost than item 1 and therefore the seller can reduce her average marginal cost by introducing
such a wasteful item. Average revenue also decreases, but as the example shows the cost-saving e¤ect
might outweigh the decrease in revenue. Furthermore, by comparing Example 4 with Example 5, we
see also that the socially wasteful product can be either the bargain or the rip-o¤.
By combining the results in Proposition 1 with the condition for an item to be socially wasteful
(i.e., vi < ci) we immediately obtain the following result.
Corollary 2 The seller supplies a socially wasteful product only if item 1 is used as the bargain. She
supplies a socially wasteful item 1 if and only if v2   c2  0 > v1   c1 and v1  . She supplies a
socially wasteful item 2 if and only if v1   c1  0 > v2   c2 and   v1.
Moreover, with limited availability the seller could even supply two socially wasteful products and
still obtain strictly positive prots.34
Example 6 (Two Wasteful Products) Let  = 1,  = 3, v1 = 20, v2 = 9, c1 = 21 and c2 = 10.
For these parametersvalues the seller prot-maximizing strategy is given by: q =
p
2 1
2 , p
min
1 = 10 and
p2 =
58q+9
2q+1 = 29  10
p
2 for a total prot of 1:57.
Example 6 shows how the seller can simultaneously exploit the aforementioned e¤ects and supply
two socially wasteful products at the same time: item 1 is highly valuable and thus allows the seller
to increase her revenue whereas item 2 has a strong cost-saving e¤ect. Unlike other models where
consumers buy socially wasteful products (i.e., Gabaix and Laibson, 2006 and Heidhues,K½oszegi and
Murooka, 2012), consumers are rational in my model and it is the combination of reference dependence
and lack of ex-ante commitment that makes them buy socially wasteful products.
I end this section with the comparative statics with respect to the productssocial value for the
sellers prots under limited availability.
Proposition 3 Let 1  
 
p1; pmin2 ; q; c1; c2

and 2  

pmin1 ; p

2; q; c1; c2

and assume   1. Then,
we have: d1dv2 >
d1dc2  > 0, d2dv1 > d2dc1  > 0, d2dv2 = d2dc2  > 0 and d1dc1  > d1dv1 > 0.
34A similar implication arises also in the paper of Heidhues and K½oszegi (forthcoming), where a single-product monopolist
sells an item valued at v > 0 by the consumers. Because the monopolist is able to extract, in expectation, more than v
from the consumer, she can still attain strictly positive prots for c > v.
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When consumers have classically-assumed reference-free preferences, increasing their valuation for
a product from v to v+ & , with & > 0, by making it more appealing, or reducing the products marginal
cost by the same amount, would have the same e¤ect on the sellers prot. Proposition 3 implies that
this is no longer the case if consumers have reference-dependent preferences.
Intuitively, since the bargain item is a bait that lures consumers into the store and that the seller
does not want to sell more often than necessary, her prots rise by more if this product is made more
appealing than if its marginal cost is reduced. Indeed, as previously highlighted, expectations-based
loss-averse preferences induce a positive demand spillover across products since the more valuable the
bargain item is, the higher the price the seller can charge the consumers for the rip-o¤.
Things are di¤erent, however, for the rip-o¤. Since this is the item the monopolist sells more often,
she has a bigger incentive to reduce its marginal cost. When item 2 is the rip-o¤, the two e¤ects go in
opposite directions, but have the same magnitude and end up o¤setting each other. When instead item
1 is the rip-o¤, the gain from reducing its marginal cost is strictly larger than the one from increasing
its appeal to consumers. In fact, if item 1 becomes more valuable by &, consumersex-ante uncertainty
in the product dimension also increases by & so that the seller can raise p1 by less than &. This can be
easily seen by recalling that the spillover e¤ect for p1 is decreasing in v1.
4.2 Distant Substitutes
The conditions for the items being close substitutes pertain to the price of the rip-o¤ item, not
the price of the bargain. Therefore, the rst four lemmas of the previous section apply also when the
products are distant substitutes, since these lemmas do not rely on any assumption concerning the
rip-o¤ item.
Recall the rst condition for close substitutability is
v2 >

1 + 
2 + + 

v1 , pmin2 > v1   v2:
If this condition is violated, it is never prot-maximizing for the seller to use product 1 as the rip-o¤
item, as shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Let pmin2  v1 v2. Then, there does not exist a limited-availability scheme, where item
1 is used as a rip-o¤, yielding a higher prot than the perfect-availability scheme in which the seller
supplies only the item with the larger social surplus and price it at its intrinsic value.
When the items are distant substitutes, and if they plan to always buy, consumers face a lot of ex-
ante uncertainty in the product dimension; therefore, in order to reduce consumersexpected gain-loss
disutility the seller must price the two goods quite closely. However, this cannot be done by using item
1 as the rip-o¤ because such a scheme necessarily requires prices being further away than valuations;
that is, p1 > v1 and p2 < v2.
The second condition for close substitutability, instead, pertains to the rip-o¤ price of product 2:
v2 >
r
v1 (1 + )
h
2 (c1   c2)

22   2+ 2   + 1

+ v1 (1 + )
i
   (  1) (1 + ) v1
22   2+ 2   + 1 :
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If the above condition is violated, then p2  pmin1 . In other words, the di¤erence v1   v2 is so
large that it is impossible for the seller to price the inferior product higher than the superior one.
Nevertheless, there exists a limited-availability scheme in which item 2 is used as the rip-o¤.
Lemma 8 If the seller uses item 1 as a bargain (i.e., p1 = pmin1 ), then its degree of availability is
q =
p2   v2
 (  1) (p2 + v2)
and the optimal price for item 2 is
p2 = min
n
pmax2 , p
min
1
o
> v2
where pmax2  1+1+ v2. Furthermore, q < 12 .
Notice also that
pmax2  pmin1 ,
v2
v1


1 + 
1 + 
2
.
Thus, di¤erently from the result in Lemma 6, when the products are not close substitutes the seller
prices them close to one another, with p1 < v1 and p2 > v2, in order to mitigate consumers expected
gain-loss disutility. Furthermore, if pmax2  pmin1 the optimal limited-availability strategy entails at
pricing so that the consumers do not face any uncertainty in price. The following proposition delivers
necessary and su¢ cient conditions for when such a limited-availability scheme is prot-maximizing.
Proposition 5 Fix any  > 0 and  > 1 and suppose v1   c1  v2   c2 :
(i) for v2v1 <

1+
1+
2
a limited-availability scheme with q = q, p1 = pmin1 and p2 = pmax2 is prot-
maximizing if and only if v1  1+1+
[(1+)2 (1+)]v2+(1+)(c1 c2)
1+ ;
(ii) for v2v1 

1+
1+
2
a limited-availability scheme with q = q, p1 = pmin1 and p2 = pmin1 is prot-
maximizing if and only if v1  1+1+
h
c1 c2
( 1)   v2
i
:
Similarly, x any  > 0 and  > 1 and suppose v1   c1 > v2   c2:
(iii) for v2v1 <

1+
1+
2
a limited-availability scheme with q = q, p1 = pmin1 and p2 = pmax2 is prot-
maximizing if and only if v1  1++2+2+2
2
1+3+2+22

c1   c2 + 1+1+ v2

;
(iv) for v2v1 

1+
1+
2
a limited-availability scheme with q = q, p1 = pmin1 and p2 = pmin1 is prot-
maximizing if and only if v2  (c1 c2)[1+( 
2+1)]+2( 1)2v1
(c1 c2)[1 (2 +2+1)] 2( 1)2v1
1+
1+v1.
Furthermore,  (p1; p2; q; c1; c2)  max fv1   c1; v2   c2g and the inequality is strict if both items are
supplied.
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It is easy to see that, as for the case of close substitutes, the bargain can be a loss leader and the
sellers product line need not be welfare-maximizing. Finally, notice that, di¤erently from the case of
close substitutes, here c2 < c1 is a necessary condition for a limited-availability scheme to be prot-
maximizing. Indeed, since the rip-o¤ price of item 2 is at most equal to the bargain price of item 1
and because the latter is always below item 1s intrinsic value, it follows that the sellers revenue with
limited availability is strictly less than v1. Hence, she must also bring her marginal cost down at least
by the same amount.
5 Extensions
In this section I analyze three extensions of the baseline model with close substitutes. In the rst
subsection, I consider the case in which the seller is able to create perfect substitutes of a given product
through a cosmetic change at no additional cost. In this case, the prot-maximizing strategy is always
a limited-availability one. Moreover, if item 2 is the socially superior item, the seller might want
to introduce the socially inferior item 1, even if she can create a perfect substitute for item 2 at no
additional cost.
In the second subsection, I consider a model in which consumers have heterogeneous tastes and I
show that even in this more general case the sellers prot-maximizing strategy is to reduce availability
and use a combination of bargains and rip-o¤s. Interestingly, with limited availability, the seller is able
to serve a larger portion of the potential demand.
In the last subsection, I relax the assumption of rational expectations and derive the prot-
maximizing strategy for a monopolist selling to overly optimistic loss-averse consumers. For moderate
levels of optimism, the sellers prot-maximizing strategy is qualitatively similar to the one with ra-
tional consumers. However, when consumers are extremely optimistic, there is no need for the seller
to o¤er a tempting deal on one item to make not buying not a credible plan. Instead, she can simply
induce the consumers to believe that they will nd the bargain item available for sure at a price equal to
its intrinsic value and then charge for the rip-o¤ the highest price consumers are willing to pay ex-post.
5.1 Endogenous Product Line
In the model of the previous section, the seller was exogenously endowed with two di¤erent products
that the consumers regarded as imperfect substitutes. However, retailers can often create almost-
perfect substitutes of a given product through a small cosmetic change that does not a¤ect consumers
valuations. For example, two TVs might share the same technology and have the same screen-size
and number of pixels, thus providing consumers with the same picture quality, and just di¤er in their
frames color. An alternative interpretation is that the seller is able to charge di¤erent prices for some
units of the same product. This happens, for example, when a retailer o¤ers a price reduction on a
particular product only for the rst units sold on a day.
To formally model this idea, consider a situation in which the seller can create a perfect substitute
for a product without incurring any additional cost and suppose she is allowed to price these de facto
identical products di¤erently. Therefore, the seller now has the choice between supplying two substi-
tutable but distinct items or just supplying two slightly di¤erent versions of the same item. In either
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case, the seller has the option of reducing the availability of one of the items, just like in the model of
the previous section.
Assume v1 > v2, ci  0, i 2 f1; 2g and, let pmini , q (; ; v1; v2; c1; c2) and q (; ; v1; v2; c1; c2) be
dened as in the previous section. Because now the seller can supply two di¤erent versions of the same
product, let pi;j be the price of the rip-o¤ item i, when item j is the bargain. The following proposition
characterizes the sellers prot-maximizing strategy.
Proposition 6 Fix any  > 0 and  > 1. If v1   c1 > v2   c2, the seller maximizes prots
by supplying two di¤erent versions of item 1: the bargain version is priced at pmin1 , with degree of
availability 1   q (; ; v1; v1; c1; c1) and the rip-o¤ version is priced at p1;1, with degree of availability
q (; ; v1; v1; c1; c1). If v1 c1  v2 c2, there exists a ev2 < v1 such that: (i) for v2  ev2 the seller max-
imizes prots by using item 1 as a bargain, with price pmin1 and degree of availability q (; ; v1; v2; c1; c2)
and item 2 as a rip-o¤, with price p2;1 and degree of availability 1 q (; ; v1; v2; c1; c2); (ii) for v2 > ev2
the seller maximizes prots by supplying two di¤erent versions of item 2: the bargain version is priced
at pmin2 , with degree of availability q (; ; v2; v2; c2; c2) and the rip-o¤ version is priced at p

2;2, with
degree of availability 1  q (; ; v2; v2; c2; c2).
Proposition 6 delivers several interesting results. First, if the seller can easily create perfect substi-
tutes of the same item that are valued equally by consumers, the prot-maximizing strategy is always
a combination of limited availability, bargains and rip-o¤s.35 This result can be interpreted as a foun-
dation for the analysis in Heidhues and K½oszegi (forthcoming): although it might not be possible for
the seller to credibly commit to a stochastic pricing strategy, she could achieve the same goal by in-
troducing many slightly di¤erent  but equivalent from the consumerspoint of view  versions of
the same product. Second, if the socially superior product is the most preferred by the consumers,
the seller prefers to create perfect substitutes of this product instead of introducing another, inferior,
one. On the other hand, if the socially superior item is the one consumers value the least, the seller
might want to supply both products, even if she could create a perfect substitute for either product
at no additional cost. The intuition is that, albeit socially inferior, item 1 is highly valuable to the
consumers and this makes it an ideal candidate for a bait because it allows the seller to charge an even
higher price for the rip-o¤, therefore increasing average revenue; although average cost also increases,
the former e¤ect might dominate. In this case the consumersmost preferred item is used as a bargain
and the sellers product line is not welfare-maximizing. Finally, it is easy to see that the results from
the previous section about loss leaders and socially wasteful products still apply in this context.
5.2 Heterogeneous Values
In the model analyzed in Section 4 the seller did not face any trade-o¤ between margins and
quantities due to the homogeneity assumption about the consumers preferences. In this section, I
consider a more general and realistic environment in which the monopolist faces a classical downward-
sloping demand curve and I show that she can still make higher prots by using a limited-availability
35The results would be the same if the seller had to incur a positive cost k to create the articial substitute, as long as
k is not too large.
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scheme with a bargain item and a rip-o¤ item. The key insight for this result is that although the
seller must choose between serving a large share of the demand with a low price or a small share of
the demand with a high price, she can still extract from the marginal consumer more than his intrinsic
value for the product.
Consider a seller supplying item 1 at a constant marginal cost c1  0 to a unit mass of consumers
who di¤er in their intrinsic value, v1, for the sellerproduct. From the sellers point of view v1 is a
random variable with distribution F . Assume F is strictly increasing, weakly convex and di¤erentiable,
with positive density f everywhere on the support
h
vl1; v
h
1
i
with vh1 > c1  vl1  0.36
Without loss aversion the seller would just choose the price bp1 that solves the following maximization
problem:
max
p1
(p1   c1) [1  F (p1)] .
Taking FOC and re-arranging yields
bp1   c1 = 1  F (bp1)
f (bp1) :
The consumer with value v1 = bp1 is the marginaltype; that is, the type who is exactly indi¤erent
between buying or not. The sellers prot is equal to
(bp1   c1) [1  F (bp1)]
and consumerssurplus is equal to
vh1Z
bp1 (v1  
bp1) dF (v1) .
As before, this perfect-availability strategy constitutes a feasible option for the seller also when
consumers are expectations-based loss-averse. To see why, notice that, given the price announced by
the seller, types below bp1 can just plan not to buy and this plan is not only consistent but it maximizes
their expected utility; similarly, types above bp1 prefer the plan of buying for sure at price bp1. Since
q1 = 1 F (bp1), the measure of types who plan to buy coincides with the amount the seller is supplying
and there is no uncertainty in the outcome that each type is expecting; therefore, gain-loss utility is
zero in equilibrium. Yet, the seller can attain a higher prot through the introduction of a limited-
availability deal. In this case the seller must induce some uncertainty in the buyersplans otherwise,
as argued above, gain-loss utility would be irrelevant.
Suppose that the seller can create an articial perfect substitute for item 1 without incurring
any additional cost and suppose she can price these de facto identical products di¤erently. A type-v
consumer will plan to buy with positive probability only if pmin1  1+1+v  pmin1 (v). From Section 4
we also know that, for given 1  q (the degree of availability of the bargain item), this consumer will be
indi¤erent between the plan of buying only the bargain item and the plan of buying the bargain item
36The assumptions on F ensure that, for deterministic prices, the demand curve is decreasing and weakly concave (a
property that is typically assumed in models of industrial organization).
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if available and the rip-o¤ item otherwise if and only if
p1 = v

1 +
2 (  1) (1  q)
1 +  (  1) (1  q)
1 + 
1 + 

 p1 (v) .
In order to maximize how much surplus she can extract from this consumer, the monopolist chooses
the following degree of availability:
q = arg max
q
qp1 (v) + (1  q) pmin1 (v)  c1:
Notice that q does not depend on either v or c1 (see appendix A for the details).
With heterogeneous values there is an additional di¢ culty in characterizing the optimal limited-
availability scheme because di¤erent types might select di¤erent PPEs. The lemma below describes the
PPEs for all consumerstypes.
Lemma 9 Suppose the seller plays the limited-availability strategy that makes a type-v consumer indif-
ferent between buying only the bargain item and always buying. Then, for types in
h
vl1; v

the PPE plan
is to never buy whereas for types in
h
v; vh1
i
the PPE plan is to always buy. Furthermore, a consumers
equilibrium expected utility is weakly increasing in his type.
In order to identify the prot-maximizing marginal type, the seller solves the following program:
max
v
h
qp1 (v) + (1  q) pmin1 (v)  c1
i
[1  F (v)] ;
which can be re-written as
max
v
(v   c1) [1  F (v)] ,
where   4 22+22+4+2 2
p
2(2++)(1+)(1+ )
( 1)(1+) > 1. Let bv1 be the solution to the above
program. It is immediate to see that bv1 < bp1, implying that the seller serves a larger fraction of the
consumers when using a limited-availability scheme. The following proposition characterizes the sellers
prot-maximizing strategy.
Proposition 7 For any  > 0 and  > 1 the seller maximizes prots by supplying two di¤erent versions
of item 1: the bargain version is priced at pmin1 (bv1), with degree of availability 1 q and the rip-o¤ version
is priced at p1 (bv1), with degree of availability q. The marginal type bv1 is implicitly dened by 1 F(bv1)f(bv1) +
c1
 = bv1. Furthermore, consumers whose type is in [bv1; vs1), where vs1 = qp1 (bv1) [1 + (1  q)  (  1)] +
(1  q) pmin1 (bv1) [1  q (  1)], get negative expected utility.
Notice that in this case the overall welfare e¤ect of limited availability is ambiguous, since with a
limited-availability scheme the seller is serving a larger measure of consumers compared to the case of
perfect availability. Nevertheless, some consumers, who would get a utility level of zero with perfect
availability, are unambiguously worse o¤ with this strategy.
The result in Proposition 7 can easily be extended to the case in which the sellers products are
not perfect substitutes and have di¤erent marginal costs. Suppose the seller cannot create a perfect
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substitute for item 1, but she can supply item 2 at a constant marginal cost c2 = c1   k  0. Let v2
denote consumerstaste for item 2 and assume v2 = v1 h. To see the intuition, suppose h = k so that
with perfect availability the seller would be exactly indi¤erent between whether to supply item 1 or 2
and the marginal types would be bp1 and bp2 = bp1   k, respectively.
With limited availability, we know from Lemma 7 that if v1   c1 = v2   c2 the seller maximizes
prots by using item 1 as the bargain item. Therefore, she supplies q units of item 1 at price pmin1 (bv1)
and 1 q units of item 2 at price p2 (bv2), where bv1 = bv2 +k and achieves higher prots than with perfect
availability. Furthermore, bv1 < bp1 so that, also in this case, limited availability implies less exclusion
than perfect availability.
5.3 Optimistic Consumers
So far I have closely followed the model of K½oszegi and Rabin (2006) by assuming that consumers
beliefs must be consistent with rationality: a consumer correctly anticipates the implications of his
period-0 plans, and makes the best plan she knows she will carry through. In this section I relax the
assumption about rational expectations.
Suppose that when the seller announces a degree of availability q for a bargain, consumers are
overly optimistic about their chance of getting a deal and when forming their purchasing plan, they
think they will get the bargain with probability eq = min fq; 1g, where  > 1 parametrizes the degree
of consumers optimism. The seller knows , but cannot be held liable for the di¤erence between
perceived and actual availability; however, she cannot reduce product availability below the level q that
she announces. On the other hand, after observing the sellers announcement of availability and prices,
consumers still select a PPE purchasing plan, but they base their decisions and payo¤scomparison on
the biased beliefs eq.
For simplicity, lets assume that the products are perfect substitutes (v1 = v2 = v > 0) and that
marginal cost is zero for both of them, and as a normalization, let item 1 be the bargain item. Denote
by bq the prot-maximizing degree of availability of item 1 when consumers have rational expectations
( = 1).
At rst glance one could be tempted to guess that with naïve consumers, the seller would always
choose a lower degree of availability for the bargain item, compared to the rational case. After all, the
seller can just announce q = bq , inducing the same attachment e¤ect as with rational consumers but
actually selling the bargain less often and hence making even higher prots. However, this intuition is
incomplete. To see why, notice that for given q and p1 that the seller announces for the bargain item,
she can raise the price of the rip-o¤ up to
p2 (q; p1) = v +

2 (  1)q
1 +  (  1)q

p1.
This means
@2p2 (q; p1)
@@q
> 0, 1  q (  1) > 0,
implying that if  is small, the marginal gain from raising q is higher when consumers are optimistic.
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The monopolist will then choose the degree of availability and price for item 1 that solves:
max
q;p1
e = qp1 + (1  q) p2 (q; p1) :
Let q (p1) be the solution to this maximization problem. The following proposition characterizes
the sellers prot-maximizing strategy.
Proposition 8 Fix any  > 0 and  > 1. There exists a e such that the sellers prot-maximizing
strategy is as follows:
(i) if  < e, she announces a degree of availability for the bargain equal to q  pmin1  ; and prices pmin1
and p2
 
q
 
pmin1

; pmin1

;
(ii) if   e, she announces a degree of availability for the bargain equal to q = 1 and prices v and
p2 = v

1 + ( 1)1+

.
Furthermore, the sellers expected prot is strictly greater than v.
The rst implication of Proposition 8 is that the monopolist prot displays a discontinuity at e.
The intuition is as follows. For moderate levels of consumersoptimism, the sellers prot-maximization
problem is very similar to the one with rational consumers: she chooses the highest price for the bargain
that makes not buying not a credible plan and the price of the rip-o¤ is such that consumers ex-ante
are (perceive to be) indi¤erent between planning to buy only the bargain and planning to always buy.
Then, she announces a degree of availability for the bargain that trades o¤ the gains from exploiting
the attachment e¤ect with those from selling the rip-o¤ more often than the bargain. Hence, except
for the fact that consumers believe to be more likely to make a deal than they actually are, the sellers
prot-maximizing limited-availability scheme is qualitatively similar to the one derived in Section 4.
Things are di¤erent, however, when consumers are very optimistic. For  = e we have that:
eq v   pmin1   eq (1  eq)  (  1) v + pmin1  = 0,
where eq = qe  pmin1 . That is, e is the lowest degree of optimism for which, when the seller plays the
scheme in part (i) of Proposition 8, consumers perceive their expected utility to be non-negative. In
this case, there is no need for the seller to o¤er a tempting deal on item 1 to make not buying not
credible; instead, she can just announce q = 1 , inducing consumers to believe that they will nd item
1 available for sure, and price item 1 at its intrinsic value and item 2 at the highest price consumers
are willing to pay ex-post. So at  = e, the degree of availability of the bargain and the prices jump
up and so does the sellers prot. Notice also that the optimal level of availability for the bargain is
not monotone in the degree of optimism , as shown in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Level of availability with naïve consumers q as a function of , for  = 1,  = 3 and v = 1.
Clearly naïvete makes consumers worse o¤. However, notice that as  tends to 1, the seller is
choosing a higher degree of availability for item 1 compared to the case with rational consumers; hence,
if  is relatively small, although overly optimistic consumers on average are exploited even more than
rational consumers, there is more of them that end up making a deal.
6 Related Literature
This paper belongs to a recent and growing literature on how rms respond to consumer loss aver-
sion. Heidhues and K½oszegi (2008), Karle and Peitz (2012) and Zhou (2011) study the implications
of reference-dependent preferences and loss aversion in an oligopolistic environment with di¤erentiated
goods. In a monopolistic-screening setting, Carbajal and Ely (2012), Hahn, Kim, Kim and Lee (2012)
and Herweg and Mierendor¤ (forthcoming) analyze the implications of reference-dependent preferences
and loss aversion for the design of prot-maximizing menus and tari¤s. Karle (2012) studies the adver-
tising strategy of a singleproduct monopolist when consumers are expectationbased loss-averse. He
shows that the seller maximizes prots by releasing an advertising signal about the consumers(un-
known ex-ante) match-value for the product that is only partially informative and would be redundant
if consumers had classical preferences; instead with loss-averse consumers this partially informative
signal can have a persuasive e¤ect and hence increase consumerswillingness to pay.37
As discussed in the Introduction, my paper is most related to Heidhues and K½oszegi (forthcoming),
which provides an explanation for why regular prices are sticky, but sales prices are variable, based
on expectations-based loss aversion. In their model, a monopolist sells only one good and maximizes
prots by employing a stochastic-price strategy made of low, variable sales prices and a high, sticky
37For other applications of the K½oszegi-Rabin model of reference-dependent preferences outside the eld of IO, see
Aperjis and Balestrieri (2010) on advategeous selection in insurance markets, Crawford and Meng (2011) and Eliaz and
Spiegler (2012) on labor supply, Herweg, Muller and Weinschenk (2010) and Macera (2012) on agency contracts, Lange
and Ratan (2010) , Eisenhuth (2012) and Eisenhuth and Ewers (2012) on sealed-bid auctions and mechanism design, and
Daido and Murooka (2012) on team incentives.
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regular price. My results share an intuition similar to theirs: low prices work as baits to lure consumers
who, once in the store, are willing to pay a price even above their intrinsic valuation for the item.
However, in my model the monopolist sells two goods and uses one of them as a bait to attract the
consumers and the other to exploit them. Also, in Heidhues and K½oszegi (forthcoming) consumers
face uncertainty about the price whereas in my case the uncertainty stems from the limited availability
of the deal.38 I consider my model to be an extension as well an improvement over theirs.39 It is
an extension because it shows that the intuition behind their main result holds also in the case of
a multi-product monopolist and it is an improvement because I nd my assumption about the seller
endogenously choosing the degree of availability of a product more realistic than their assumption of
the seller being able to credibly commit to an entire price distribution.40 Moreover, by analyzing the
case of a multi-product retailer, I can derive predictions about which products are more likely to be
put on sale and I show that higher-value products are more likely to be used as baits.
Within the realm of industrial organization, this paper is also closely related to the literature on
advertising, bait-and-switch and loss leaders. Lazear (1995) studies a duopoly with di¤erentiated goods
in which each rm produces only one good and consumers pay a search cost to visit a rm, and derives
the conditions under which bait-and-switch is a protable strategy. Although consumers have rational
expectations and understand that a rm might engage in bait-and-switch, this strategy can be protable
if the goods sold by di¤erent rms are similar and if search is costly. However, bait-and-switch is a form
of false advertising in which a rm claims to sell a di¤erent good than the one it actually produces. In
my model, instead, the rm is not lying to the consumers but is using a truthful version of the bait and
switch strategy through endogenously reducing the availability of the goods. Furthermore, in Lazears
model prices are exogenous whereas in mine they are optimally chosen by the seller. Gerstner and
Hess (1990) present a model of bait-and-switch in which retailers advertise only selected brands, low-
priced advertised brands are understocked and in-store promotions are biased towards more expensive
substitute brands. In their model consumers are rational and foresee stock outages. However, the
authors assume that in-store promotions can create a permanent utility increase for consumers and this
is the reason why in equilibrium some consumers will switch to more expensive brands.
Ellison (2005) presents a model of competitive price discrimination with horizontal and vertical taste
di¤erences across consumers in which rms advertise a base price for a product and then try to sell
add-onsor more sophisticated versions of the product for a higher price at the point of sale. Gabaix
and Laibson (2006) study a model where rms benet from shrouding add-on prices if there myopic
consumers who, mistakenly, do not consider the add-on price when forming their shopping plans. Apart
from the result that the basicversion of the product can be a loss leader, my model is di¤erent since
I assume that all prices are known and that consumers correctly predict their own shopping behavior.
38 If consumers value the two goods equally and the goods have the same production cost, my model coincides with a
special case of theirs in which the monopolist uses a two-price distribution. However, in my model the seller can credibly
announce to the consumers that she is having a sale on some selected products  as stores often do indeed  whereas in
their model the seller can only announce that she might have a sale.
39Spiegler (2012a) proposes another simplication and extension of Heidhues and K½oszegi (forthcoming).
40After entering a store that claims to use a stochastic-pricing strategy à la Heidhues and K½oszegi (forthcoming), and
faced with a high-price draw, a consumer might reasonably doubt whether he was just unlucky or whether the seller was
just pretending to randomize prices. In my model, instead, if a consumer does not nd a bargain available, he has less of a
reason to blame the seller because other consumers might have bought all the bargain items and he might even be mad at
himself for not having gone to the store earlier. I thank Kr Eliaz for suggesting this shifting the blameinterpretation.
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Furthermore, the situation described in Example 2 in the Introduction, where the more sophisticated
version of the product is o¤ered at a lower price, can be rationalized by my model but not theirs.
Eliaz and Spiegler (2011a) propose a model where stores compete for consumerslimited attention by
expanding their product lines with pure attention grabbers; that is, loss-leading products that have
the sole purpose of attracting consumersattention to the other products o¤ered by the store. Once at
the store, a consumer might realize that there exists another product that better suits his needs. Thus,
di¤erently from my model, a consumer might switch to another product with a larger margin even if
the bargain item is still available.
Hess and Gerstner (1987) develop a model in which multi-product rms might stock out of advertised
products and o¤er rain checks to consumers, and Lal and Matutes (1994) consider multi-product rms
competing for consumers who are initially unaware of prices. In both of these models rms might
advertise loss leaders in order to increase store tra¢ c. The protability of this strategy, then, stems
from the fact that once they arrive at the store, consumers will buy also other complementary items
that are priced at a high mark-up; that is, each rm enjoys a form of monopoly on the other items
once a consumer is attracted into the store by the loss leader.41 My model is di¤erent as I consider
a monopolist selling substitutable goods to consumers who demand at most one unit of one good and
therefore loss-leading is not aimed at increasing store tra¢ c in order to boost demand for complementary
products. Furthermore, in these models the products with lower consumer value are the more natural
candidates for loss-leading pricing; my model instead can also rationalize the use of more valuable or
popular products as loss leaders.
Models of price dispersion under demand uncertainty (Dana, 1999, 2001a; Deneckere and Peck,
1995; Nocke and Peitz, 2007) and buying frenzies (De Graba 1995; Gilbert and Klemperer, 2000) also
predict that rationing some consumers through voluntary stockouts can be a prot-maximizing strategy.
However, these models apply mainly to new products that are launched on the market for the rst time
and for which either the seller or the consumers cannot predict what actual demand will turn out to
be; or to industries with clear binding capacity constraints like airlines, hotels and restaurants. Yet,
goods sold during bargain sales are usually not appearing on the market for the rst time. Moreover, in
these models, once the true demand-state is revealed, the scope for rationing disappears; in my model,
instead, the scope for rationing arises directly from the consumerspreferences.
Finally, Thanassoulis (2004) studies the problem of a multi-product monopolist selling two substitute
goods to risk-neutral consumers with unit demand, and derives conditions such that the optimal tari¤
includes lotteries.42 In my model, when the seller endogenously reduces the availability of the goods,
from the consumerspoint of view this is equivalent to taking a lottery on both which good they will
41Related, but somewhat di¤erent explanations for the use of loss leaders are advanced by DeGraba (2006) and Chen
and Rey (2012). DeGraba (2006) presents a multi-product pricing model in which the loss leaders are the goods purchased
mainly by more protable consumers  consumers who are more likely to buy larger quantities of other goods as well;
hence, loss-leading is a way to price discriminate between di¤erently protable consumers. In Chen and Rey (forthcoming),
a large retailer, competing with smaller stores o¤ering a narrower range of products, can exercise market power by pricing
below costs some of the products o¤ered also by its rivals. Thus, loss-leading emerges as an exploitative device that allows
the large retailer to discriminate multi-stop shoppers from one-stop shoppers.
42Pavlov (2011) solves for the optimal mechanism when selling two substitutable goods and generalizes the analysis
in Thanassoulis (2004). Balestrieri and Leao (2011) extend this result to an oligopoly setting where consumers have
horizonally di¤erentiated tastes. Fay and Xie (2008) show how lotteries can provide a bu¤er against a sellers own demand
uncertainty and capacity constraints.
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end up with and how much they will have to pay.43 Nevertheless, there are several di¤erences between
his model and mine. First, my result on the optimality of limited-availability deals holds also when
consumers have homogeneous tastes, whereas his result on the optimality of lotteries does not. Second,
in his lotteries there is uncertainty only on the item dimension but not on the price one, whereas in my
case the uncertainty is on both dimensions. Last, in his model a lottery is o¤ered in addition to each
good being o¤ered in isolation with its own posted price; in my model instead each good is o¤ered in
isolation with its own price, but because the items are in short supply, consumers are uncertain about
their consumption outcomes.
7 Conclusion
Limited-availability sales are commonly employed by retailers selling durable consumer goods such
as electronics, household appliances, or clothes. However, while this type of sales are familiar to
consumers, economists have not devoted much attention to the importance of product availability in
retailing.
In this paper, I have provided an explanation, based on consumer loss aversion, for why a monopolist
selling substitute goods might nd it protable to use limited-availability sales. The optimal strategy for
the monopolist resembles bait-and-switch: she lures the consumers with a limited-availability tempting
deal on one good and cashes in with a high price on another one. The model also predicts that more
valuable or popular items are more likely to be used as baits and that the bait can be a loss leader.
I conclude the paper by discussing some of the models limitations, as well as some directions for
future research.
An implicit premise of my model is that consumers cannot commit not to go shopping. Although
this might seem unrealistic, there exist some real-life situations in which this assumption is not that
restrictive. For example, around Christmas many consumers have to go shopping in order to buy
gifts for their friends and relatives. Furthermore, committing not to look at ads or not to learn about
sales to avoid being manipulated by rms might require some costly e¤ort on the part of the consumers.
If this is the case, then the seller could easily bribethe consumers into visiting the store.44
Another important assumption is that, from the consumersperspective, the two products belong
to the same hedonic dimension. This creates an insurance e¤ect: by planning to always buy a consumer
can reduce the uncertainty in his consumption compared to the plan of buying only the bargain item.
The monopolist then, is able to exploit this insurance e¤ect by charging a high price for the rip-o¤
item. If the two goods were evaluated along di¤erent hedonic dimensions, the insurance e¤ect would
disappear, making the conditions for always buying to be the PPE more restrictive.
43Thanassoulis (2004) makes also the related point that capacity constraints, actual or alleged, are an indirect way to
implement lotteries.
44 In fact, introducing a small shopping cost into the model would not signicantly a¤ect the results. To see why,
suppose that consumers must incur a positive shopping cost , with 0 <  < pmin2 , to go to the store and let the gain-
loss utility in the shopping cost be evaluated separately from the product and money dimensions. Then, there exists a
 (; ; v1; v2; c1; c2) such that for    the sellers prot-maximizing strategy is a limited-availability scheme with the
only di¤erence that now the price of the bargain must be reduced by 
q
(or 
1 q , depending on which item is the bargain)
in order to make never buying non-credible for the consumers and therefore induce them to visit the store (the price of
the rip-o¤ should also be adjusted accordingly).
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The analysis in this paper can be extended to the case of a monopolist carrying more than two
goods. If the goods are perfect substitutes, or if the seller can endogenously ne tune their degree of
di¤erentiation, then she will always use as many products as possible and price them slightly di¤erent to
mitigate the consumerscomparison e¤ect on the price dimension, implementing de facto the random-
price strategy described in Heidhues and K½oszegi (forthcoming). However, if the products are not close
enough in terms of substitutability, then the seller will supply only the most similar ones.
I have closely followed the model of K½oszegi and Rabin (2006) in specifying the reference point
as the entire distribution of consumersrational beliefs. However, the analysis would be the same if
the reference point, for each hedonic dimension, was equal to the point expectation instead of the
distribution. In fact, since all lotteries that consumers face in the model involve comparing only two
possible outcomes, each realization is either a loss or a gain, and the same would still be true if the
reference point was a point expectation. On the other hand, the assumption that consumers assess
gains and losses separately on each hedonic dimension of consumption utility is crucial for the results.
If gain-loss utility were dened on the consumersintrinsic surplus, v   p, then the seller could never
raise p above v and the prot-maximizing scheme would be a perfect-availability one.
I have also assumed that all consumers show up at the store at the same time and are served
randomly with equal probability. In reality, however, especially during popular promotions like Black
Friday, consumers line up outside stores before they open. This suggests that consumersheterogeneity
in waiting costs is likely to play a role. Also, those consumers planning to go later in the day would
most likely hold di¤erent beliefs about their chances of getting the bargain.
Since my model is one-shot, once a consumer arrives at the store and realizes there are no items left
for a discounted price anymore, he has to choose between the feeling of loss on the item dimension by
returning home empty-handed or the feeling of loss by paying a higher price for a substitute. In reality,
the consumer could decide to wait and return to the store some time later. More generally, sales and
promotions appear to be periodic and inter-temporal price discrimination on the part of rms is a big
part of the story.
It would be interesting to study which results of this model, if any, continue to hold in a (possibly
imperfect) competitive environment. Indeed, one of the most striking features of popular sales like
Black Friday is that all retailers use limited-availability deals at the same time. At rst glance, since
Heidhues and K½oszegi (forthcoming) show that their result does not hold in an environment with two
retailers selling a homogeneous product and competing à la Bertrand, one might think that also the
results of this paper would not survive. However, given the multi-product framework that characterizes
my model, rms would have a di¤erent strategy-space than in Heidhues and K½oszegi (forthcoming).
The interaction between the retailer and the manufacturing sector, not modeled in this paper, could
also be an interesting topic for further research. For example, if both goods are produced by the same
upstream rm, then since the retailer is able to extract more surplus from the consumers through a
limited-availability scheme, the rm could try to design a contractual agreement through which she
extracts some of this extra surplus. On the other hand, if the goods are produced by two independent
manufacturers, the rm producing the good used as a bargain might want to prohibit the retailer from
using a limited-availability scheme, since this scheme shifts sales away from the bargain and towards
the rip-o¤.
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A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1: As shown in K½oszegi and Rabin (2006), the plan of buying good i = 1; 2 is
a PE if and only if pi  1+1+ vi  pmaxi and the plan of not buying good i is a PE if and only if
pi >
1+
1+vi  pmini . Therefore, for pi 2
 
pmini ; p
max
i

both plans are consistent. However, the plan of
buying good i at pi is the PPE if and only if
EU [fig j fig]  EU [f?g j f?g]
, vi   pi  0
and this proves the statement. 
Proof of Lemma 2: The result holds trivially for the case of perfect availability. Then, let q1 > 0,
q2 > 0 with q1 + q2 < 1 and suppose the seller charges p1 for item 1 and p2 for item 2, with p2  p1.
The highest price the seller can charge for item 2 is the one that makes the following inequality bind:
EU [f1; 2g j f1; 2g]  EU [f?g j f?g] : (13)
Substituting and re-arranging yields
p2  v2 [1 +  (  1) q1    (  1) (1  q1   q2)]  2 (  1) q1
1 +  (  1) (1  q2) :
It is easy to see that the right-hand-side of the above inequality is increasing in q2. Therefore, the
seller can raise q2 up to 1   q1 and increase her prots without violating condition (13). A similar
analysis applies if p2 < p1. 
Proof of Lemma 3: I prove the result by contradiction. Suppose that q 2 (0; 1) and pi = vi for
i = 1; 2 and that v1 > 2v2; then we have that
EU [f?g j f?g] = 0
>  2 (  1) q (1  q) v2 = EU [f2;?g j f2;?g]
>  2 (  1) q (1  q) (v1   v2) = EU [f1; 2g j f1; 2g]
>  2 (  1) q (1  q) v1 = EU [f1;?g j f1;?g] :
Furthermore, we know that not buying is a PE when pi = vi. Therefore, for this quantity vector
and this price vector the buyers would strictly prefer the plan of not buying . The seller would then
do better by setting pi = pmini for at least one good and thus force the consumers to buy it. The same
argument applies to the case in which v1  2v2 (just switch the rst and second inequalities). 
Proof of Lemma 4: I prove the result by contradiction. Suppose that q 2 (0; 1) and pi > pmini for
i = 1; 2 and that v1   c1  v2   c2. By producing a strictly positive quantity of both goods, the seller
wants the buyers to choose the plan to always buy; however, for this plan to be the PPE it must be
that
EU [f1; 2g j f1; 2g]  EU [f?g j f?g]
) q (v1   p1) + (1  q) (v2   p2) > 0
, qp1 + (1  q) p2 < qv1 + (1  q) v2
) q (p1   c1) + (1  q) (p2   c2) < q (v1   c1) + (1  q) (v2   c2)  v1   c1:
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But then the seller would prefer to set q = 1 and p1 = v1 and this contradicts the assumption that
seller produces a strictly positive quantity of both goods. The same argument applies to the case in
which v1   c1 < v2   c2. 
Proof of Lemma 5: Let q 2 (0; 1). From Lemma 4 we know that pi = pmini for at least one good;
let this be good 2. I now show that it is not protable for the seller to choose p1 such that the plan
to always buy is the unique credible plan for the consumers. First, we have that, for p2 = pmin2 , the
highest price the seller can use, in order to make the plan to buy only good 2 not credible, is
p1 
(1 + ) v1 +  (  1) (1  q) v2

1 + 1+1+

1 + 
 ep1 (q)
Then, we have that, for p2 = pmin2 , the plan to always buy is a PE if and only if
p1 
[1 +  (1  q) + q] v1 +  (  1) (1  q) v2

1 + 1+1+

1 + q +  (1  q)  p1 (q) :
It is readily veried that p1 (q) > ep1 (q) , q > 0. However, for p1 (q)  p1 > ep1 (q) both the plan
to always buy and the plan to buy only item 2 are personal equilibria; but the plan of always buying
is the PPE if and only if
p1  v1 + 2 (1  q)  (  1) [v2 (2 +  + )  v1 (1 + )]
(1 + ) [1 +  (  1) (1  q)]  bp1 (q) :
It is easy to see that bp1 (q) > ep1 (q). Therefore, the highest price p1 at which a buyer prefers the
plan to always buy is given by
p1 = min fp1 (q) ; bp1 (q)g
and this proves that it is not prot-maximizing for the seller to make always buying the unique consistent
plan.
Then, in order to prove that p1 = bp1 (q), notice that
p1 (q) < bp1 (q)
, q <
v2 (1 + 2) (2 +  + )  v1 (1 + ) (1 + ) 
q
A2v21   2Bv1v2 + C2v22
2v2 (  1) (2 +  + )
whereA   (1 + ) (1 + ), B   (1 + ) (2 +  + ) [3 + 2 + 2 (  1)] andC  (1 + 2) (2 +  + ).
It is also easy to verify that
v2 (1 + 2) (2 +  + )  v1 (1 + ) (1 + ) 
q
A2v21   2Bv1v2 + C2v22
2v2 (  1) (2 +  + ) < 1:
However, it is in the sellers interest to select the p1 that maximizes qp1 and since
v2 (2 +  + )  v1 (1 + ) > 0) @ [qbp1 (q)]
@q
> 0,
it follows that p1 = bp1 (q). The same argument applies if the seller uses item 1 as the bargain (i.e.,
p1 = p
min
1 ). 
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Proof of Lemma 6: Suppose the seller uses item 2 as the bargain and thus prices it at pmin2 . Then,
by Lemma 5 we know that the optimal price for item 1 is
p1 = v1 +
2 (1  q)  (  1) [v2 (2 +  + )  v1 (1 + )]
(1 + ) [1 +  (  1) (1  q)] :
This pair of prices provides the seller with prots equal to
q
8<:v1 [1   (  1) (1  q)] + 2 (  1) (1  q)

1 + 1+1+

v2
1 +  (  1) (1  q)   c1
9=;
+ (1  q)

pmin2   c2

:
The above expression is maximized at
q =
1 +   
 (  1)  
p
2
 (  1)
p
(1 +   ) ( v1 + 2v2 + v2   v1 + v2)p
( c1 + c2   v1) (1 + ) + v2 (3 +  + 2)
 q (; ; v1; v2; c1; c2) :
Notice that for the above expression to be well-dened, it must be that
( c1 + c2   v1) (1 + ) + v2 (3 +  + 2) > 0
since we know that (2 +  + ) v2 > (1 + ) v1 for p1 to be greater than v1. It is easy to see that
q > 0. Furthermore, we have that
q < 1, v1
h
1 + 3  2 + 22 (  1)
i
< (c1   c2) (1 + ) +
v2
h
1 + 4  3 + 22 (  1) (+ 1)
i
:
Notice that
q (; ; v1; v2; c1; c2) >
1
2
since
q (; ; v1; v2; c1; c2) > q (; ; v; v; c; c)
, 1 +   
 (  1)  
p
2
 (  1)
p
(1 +   ) ( v1 + 2v2 + v2   v1 + v2)p
( c1 + c2   v1) (1 + ) + v2 (3 +  + 2)
>
1 +   
 (  1)  
p
2
 (  1)
s
(1 + ) (   + 1)
( + + 2)
, (1 + ) (1 +   ) [(c1   c2) (1 + ) + (v2   v1) (1 + )] < 0
which is true for any  > 0 and  > 1 provided that v1   c1 > v2   c2 (which, as shown below, is a
necessary condition for the seller to use item 2 as the bargain); and
q (; ; v; v; c; c) >
1
2
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, 1
 (  1) (   + 1) 
1
 (  1)
s
2 (1 + ) (   + 1)
 + + 2
>
1
2
,
 (  1)

22 + 6  2   6 + 4

 + + 2
> 0
which is true for any  > 0 and  > 1.
If instead the seller uses item 1 as the bargain, then by Lemma 5 we know that the optimal price
for item 2 is
p2 = v2 +
2qv1 (  1) (1 + )
(1 + ) [1 +  (  1) q] :
This pair of prices provides the seller with prots equal to
q

pmin1   c1

+ (1  q)
8<:v2 [1 +  (  1) q] + 2 (  1) q

1+
1+

v1
1 +  (  1) q   c2
9=; :
The above expression is maximized at
q =
p
2
 (  1)
p
v1 (1 + ) (1 +   )p
(c1   c2 + v2) (1 + ) + v1 (1 + )
  1
 (  1)
 q (; ; v1; v2; c1; c2) :
We have that
q < 1, v1 (1 + ) (1 +    ) < (1   + ) (v2   c2 + c1) (1 + ) .
Similarly, we also have
q > 0, v1 (1 + ) (1 + 2  2) > (v2   c2 + c1) (1 + ) :
Notice that
q (; ; v1; v2; c1; c2) <
1
2
, 2
s
2v1 (1 + ) (1 +   )
(c1   c2 + v1 + v2 + v1 + c1   c2 + v2) <  (  1) + 2
,
n
8 (1 +   )  [ (  1) + 2]2
o
(1 + ) v1 < (v2   c2 + c1) (1 + ) [ (  1) + 2]2 : (14)
Condition (14) is trivially satised for any  > 0 and  > 1 if v2 c2  v1 c1 since [ (  1) + 2]2 n
8 (1 +   )  [ (  1) + 2]2
o
= 22 (  1)2 > 0. Condition (14) holds also for v2   c2 < v1   c1
if   1 since, as shown below in the proof of proposition 1, if the seller prefers to use item 1 as the
bargain when this is the item with the larger social surplus then v1 < (v2   c2 + c1)

1+
1+

.
Finally, we have that
q > 1  q
, v2 (2 +  + )  v1 (1 + )
( c1 + c2   v1) (1 + ) + v2 (3 +  + 2) <
v1 (1 + )
(c1   c2 + v2) (1 + ) + v1 (1 + )
, v2 (2 + + ) (v2   v1 + c1   c2)   (  1) v1 (c1   c2) < 0
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which holds for any  > 0 and  > 1 given we know that v2 (2 + + ) > v1 (1 + ) from Lemma
5 and provided that v1   c1 > v2   c2 which, as shown below, is the only case in which q and q are
comparable. 
Proof of Lemma 7: Dene 1  
 
p1; pmin2 ; q; c1; c2

and 2  

pmin1 ; p

2; q; c1; c2

and recall that
q = arg max
q

 
p1; pmin2 ; q; c1; c2

and q = arg max
q

 
pmin1 ; p

2; q; c1; c2

.
First, consider the special case with v1 = v2 and c1 = c2. It is easy to see that in this case
pmin1 = p
min
2 , p

1 = p

2, q = 1  q so that 1 = 2. Therefore the seller is indi¤erent between which item
to use as the bargain. Furthermore, by the envelope theorem we have that d1dc1 =  q, d1dc2 =   (1  q),
d2
dc1
=  

1  q

and d2dc2 =  q. By lemma 6 we know that q > 1  q and therefore it follows that when
the two goods are perfect substitutes, the seller maximizes prots by using the more expensive one as
the bargain.
Next, suppose to change v1 by dv1 and c1 by dc1 with dv1 = dc1 =  > 0 so that v1 > v2 but
v1   v2 = c1   c2.
By the envelope theorem the e¤ect of these changes on prots are
d1 ' @1
@v1
dv1 +
@1
@c1
dc1 =

q
@p1
@v1
  q


and
d2 ' @2
@v1
dv1 +
@2
@c1
dc1 =

q
1 + 
1 + 
+

1  q
 @p2
@v1
  q

:
By substituting and re-arranging, it follows that d2 > d1 if and only if
q
 (  1)
1 + 
242

1  q

(1 + )  q (  1)  1
q (  1) + 1
35 > q 1   (  1) (1  q)
1 +  (  1) (1  q)   1

: (15)
As the expression on the right-hand-side of (15) is negative, it su¢ ces to show that
2

1  q

(1 + )  q (  1)  1 > 0, 1 + 2
2 +  + 
> q:
Substituting v1 = v2 and c1 = c2 into the expression for q yields
2 +  + +  (  1) (1 + 2)
2 +  + 
>
s
2 +  + +  (  1) (1 + 2)
2 +  + 
which is of course true for any  > 0 and  > 1. Thus, the seller maximizes prots by using item 1
as the bargain if v1 > v2 and v1  v2 = c1  c2. Furthermore, it is easy to see that the same result holds
also if dc1 > dv1 > 0 so that v1   c1 < v2   c2. Therefore, we have that 2  1 for v1   c1  v2   c2.
Finally, consider the case in which v1   c1 > v2   c2. Again, lets start with v1 = v2 and c1 = c2 so
that 1 = 2 and suppose to change v1 by dv1 and c1 by dc1 with either dv1 > dc1  0 or dv1  0 > dc1.
By the envelope theorem the e¤ect of these changes on prots are
d1 ' @1
@v1
dv1 +
@1
@c1
dc1 = q
@p1
@v1
dv1   qdc1
and
d2 ' @2
@v1
dv1 +
@2
@c1
dc1 =

q
1 + 
1 + 
+

1  q
 @p2
@v1

dv1   qdc1:
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By substituting and re-arranging, it follows that d1  d2 if and only if"
1   (  1) (1  q)
1 +  (  1) (1  q)q  
1 + 
1 + 
q  

1  q
 1 + 
1 + 
2q (  1)
1 + q (  1)
#
dv1 

q   q

dc1: (16)
We know that for dv1 = dc1 > 0 condition (16) is violated; but for either dv1 > dc1  0 or
dv1  0 > dc1 it can hold (for example, it is readily satised for dv1 = 0 and dc1 < 0). Then, let ev1
be the value of v1 for which (16) binds; if such a value exists then it is unique because the term on the
left-hand-side of (16) is continuous and increasing in dv1. Notice also that ev1 increases with c1   c2.
However, from lemma 6 we know that
q < 1, v1 < (c1   c2) (1 + ) + v2 (1 + 4  3) + 2
2v2 (  1) (+ 1)
1 + 3  2 + 22 (  1) .
Therefore, a necessary condition for the seller to use item 2 as the bargain when v1   c1 > v2   c2
is that
(c1   c2) (1 + ) + v2 (1 + 4  3) + 22v2 (  1) (+ 1)
1 + 3  2 + 22 (  1) > v2   c2 + c1
,  (  1) [2 (1 + ) (c2   c1) + v2 (1 + 2)] > 0
, 2 (1 + ) (c2   c1) + v2 (1 + 2) > 0
, v2 > 2 (1 + ) (c1   c2)
1 + 2
:
However, the above condition is not su¢ cient as it could still be that
ev1 > (c1   c2) (1 + ) + v2 (1 + 4  3) + 22v2 (  1) (+ 1)
1 + 3  2 + 22 (  1) : 
Proof of Proposition 1: For an arbitrary price-pair (p1; p2) and an arbitrary quantity-pair (q; 1  q)
the monopolists prot is
 (p1; p2; q; c1; c2) = q (p1   c1) + (1  q) (p2   c2) :
By Lemma 1 we know that if the seller produces only one good, then she will price it at its intrinsic
value.
By Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 we know that if the seller produces a strictly positive quantity of both
goods then one of them, say good i, must be priced at the discounted price pmini . By Lemma 5 we also
know that in this case the seller will price good j at pj . Therefore, the seller has three options:
i) Set p2 = pmin2 , p1 = p

1 and q = q. In this case the sellers prot is
q (p1   c1) + (1  q)

pmin2   c2

 1:
ii) Set p1 = pmin1 , p2 = p

2 and q = q. In this case the sellers prot is
q

pmin1   c1

+

1  q

(p2   c2)  2:
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iii) Set pi = vi for i = 1; 2. This pair of prices provides the seller with prots equal to
q (v1   c1) + (1  q) (v2   c2) :
The above expression is maximized at q = 1 (resp. q = 0) if v1 c1 > v2 c2 (resp. if v1 c1  v2 c2).
Depending on the degree of substitutability between the two goods, their marginal costs and the
degree of loss aversion, the seller will choose the option that will give her the highest prot. Suppose
rst that v1   c1  v2   c2. By Lemma 7 we know that if she were to produce both goods, the seller
would prefer to use item 1 as the bargain Then,


pmin1 ; p

2; q; c1; c2

 v2   c2
, v1  v2   c2 + c1
1 + 2 (  1)
1 + 
1 + 
  (v2; c1; c2; ; ) :
Now suppose that ev1 > v1 > v2   c2 + c1. By Lemma 7 we know that if she were to produce both
goods, the seller would again prefer to use item 1 as the bargain. Therefore,


pmin1 ; p

2; q; c1; c2

 v1   c1
, v1  (v2   c2 + c1)

1 + 
1 + 

 (; )   (v2; c1; c2; ; ) :
where
 (; ) [1 +  (  1)]
24 3 + 42+23+22 (1 + )   1 + 32 + 4 2 (  1)
q
2 (1 + )3+1
4 (1 + 3) +44 233 (1 + 3) +22 (132 + 2   5) 2 (63   3 + 1) +1
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Furthermore, since  (; ) < 1 for   1, we have that
  1)  (v2; c1; c2; ; ) < (v2   c2 + c1)

1 + 
1 + 

.
Finally, if v1  ev1 then by Lemma 7 the seller prefers to use item 2 as the bargain and we have


p1; p
min
2 ; q; c1; c2

 v1   c1 , v2  v1   c1 + c2 + 2 (  1) v1
1 +  (  1)

3+2+2
1+
   (v1; c1; c2; ; ) :
To conclude the proof, notice that the sellers prots, if she chooses to produce only one good, are
equal to max fv1   c1; v2   c2g. Since she would choose a di¤erent option only if this provides her with
at least as much, it thus follows that   max fv1   c1; v2   c2g, and the inequality is strict when either
option i) or ii) is prot-maximizing. 
Proof of Proposition 2: Suppose the seller uses item 2 as the bargain. We have:
q (p1   c1) + (1  q)

pmin2   c2

> max fv1   c1; v2   c2g
 q (v1   c1) + (1  q) (v2   c2)
) qp1 + (1  q) pmin2 > qv1 + (1  q) v2.
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In this case, therefore, a consumer expects to buy with probability one at an expected price strictly
greater than his expected valuation. Hence, his consumption utility is negative. Furthermore, in any
PE expected gain-loss utility is non-positive. If instead he could commit to the plan of never buying,
both his consumption utility and his gain-loss utility would be zero. The same argument applies for
the case in which the seller uses item 1 as the bargain. 
Proof of Proposition 3: First, consider the sellers prots when item 1 is used as the bargain. We
have:
2 = 

pmin1 ; p

2; q; c1; c2

= q

pmin1   c1

+

1  q

(p2   c2) .
By the envelope theorem, we have that:
d2
dv1
= q
@pmin1
@v1
+

1  q
 @p2
@v1
=
1 + 
1 + 
q +

1  q
 1 + 
1 + 
2 (  1) q
1 +  (  1) q
=
1 + 
1 + 
q
241 + 2 (  1)

1  q

1 +  (  1) q
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> q
=
d2dc1

where the inequality follows from
1 +
2 (  1)

1  q

1 +  (  1) q >
1 + 
1 + 
, 2

1  q

(1 + ) > 1 +  (  1) q
, 1 + 2
2 + + 
> q
, v1 <
2 ( + 1)

22   2+ 2   + 1

(c1   c2 + v2)
2 + 32 + 23 + 22 + 2  22  23+ 2
and
2 ( + 1)

22   2+ 2   + 1

(c1   c2 + v2)
2 + 32 + 23 + 22 + 2  22  23+ 2 >  (v2; c1; c2; ; )
for   1.
Similarly, we also have that
d2
dv2
=

1  q
 @p2
@v1
=

1  q

=
d2dc2
 :
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Next, consider the sellers prots when item 2 is used as the bargain. We have:
1 = 

p1; p
min
2 ; q; c1; c2

= q (p1   c1) + (1  q)

pmin2   c2

.
Then, we have that
d1
dv1
= q
@p1
@v1
= q

1   (  1) (1  q)
1 +  (  1) (1  q)

< q
=
d1dc1
 .
Similarly,
d1
dv2
= q
@p1
@v2
+ (1  q) @p
min
2
@v2
=
2 (  1) (2 + + ) q (1  q)
(1 + ) [1 +  (  1) (1  q)] + (1  q)
1 + 
1 + 
= (1  q)

2 (  1) (2 + + ) q
(1 + ) [1 +  (  1) (1  q)] +
1 + 
1 + 

> (1  q)
=
d1dc2

where the inequality follows from
2 (  1) (2 + + ) q
(1 + ) [1 +  (  1) (1  q)] +
1 + 
1 + 
> 1
, 2 (2 + + ) q > 1 +  (  1) (1  q)
, (4 + 3+ ) q > 1 +  (  1)
( q > 1
2
and this concludes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 4: If the seller uses item 1 as the rip-o¤, item 2 must be priced at pmin2 . Let
pmin2  v1   v2. First, notice that if the seller uses item 1 as the rip-o¤, then it must be that p1 > v1.
To see why, suppose, by contradiction, that p1  v1. The sellers prot is
q (p1   c1) + (1  q)

pmin2   c2

:
We have that
p1  v1 ) q (p1   c1) + (1  q)

pmin2   c2

< q (v1   c1) + (1  q) (v2   c2) < max fv1   c1; v2   c2g .
But then the seller would prefer to choose either q = 1 or q = 0, contradicting the hypothesis that
she is producing a strictly positive quantity of both goods.
Next, recall that the sellers scheme must make the consumers indi¤erent between planning to buy
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only the bargain (item 2 in this case) and planning to always buy:
(1  q)

v2   pmin2

  q (1  q)  (  1)

v2 + p
min
2

= q (v1   p1) + (1  q)

v2   pmin2

 q (1  q)  (  1)

v1   v2 + p1   pmin2

, (1  q)  (  1)
h
v1 + p1   2

v2 + p
min
2
i
= v1   p1: (17)
Since the right-hand-side of (17) is negative, it follows that
v1 + p1   2

v2 + p
min
2

< 0
, v1 + p1
2
  v2 < pmin2 . (18)
Condition(18) and the assumption that pmin2  v1   v2 combined together imply
v1 + p1
2
  v2 < v1   v2 , p1 < v1.
The result then follows by reductio ad absurdum. 
Proof of Lemma 8: Let p1 = pmin1 and suppose p2 < p1. Let q 2 (0; 1) be the degree of availability
of the bargain item, and suppose consumers plan to always buy. If item 2 is the only product left in
the store, a consumer will follow his plan and buy if
U [(v2; p2) j f1; 2g]  U [(0; 0) j f1; 2g]
, v2   p2   q (v1   v2) + q

pmin1   p2

  qv1   (1  q) v2 + qpmin1 + (1  q) p2
, p2  1 + 
1 + 
v2  pmax2 .
However, we assumed that the price of good 2 must be lower than the price of good 1. Hence, if
pmax2 > p
min
1 , v2 >

1 + 
1 + 
2
v1
then the highest price that the seller could charge for good 2 is pmin1 .
Given that the seller is charging the highest price for good 2 that consumers are willing to pay ex-
post, she must select a degree of availability for good 1 that makes consumers ex-ante indi¤erent between
planning to buy only the bargain item and planning to always buy. Suppose rst that p2 = pmax2 . Then
we have
q

v1   pmin1

  q (1  q)  (  1)

v1 + p
min
1

= q

v1   pmin1

+ (1  q) (v2   pmax2 )
 q (1  q)  (  1)

v1   v2 + pmin1   pmax2

, q = p
max
2   v2
 (  1) (pmax2 + v2)
:
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Next, suppose that p2 = pmin1 . Then we have
q

v1   pmin1

  q (1  q)  (  1)

v1 + p
min
1

= q

v1   pmin1

+ (1  q)

v2   pmin1

 q (1  q)  (  1) (v1   v2)
, q = p
min
1   v2
 (  1)  pmin1 + v2 :
Therefore, in both cases we have that
q =
p2   v2
 (  1) (p2 + v2)  q
.
Finally, notice that
pmax2   v2
 (  1) (pmax2 + v2)
>
pmin1   v2
 (  1)  pmin1 + v2 , pmax2 > pmin1
and
pmax2   v2
 (  1) (pmax2 + v2)
=
1+
1+ v2   v2
 (  1)

1+
1+ v2 + v2

=
1
2 +  + 
<
1
2
for any  > 0 and  > 1. Hence, q < 12 . This concludes the proof of the lemma. 
Proof of Proposition 5: Suppose v2   c2  v1   c1 and that v2v1 <

1+
1+
2
. Hence, the rip-o¤ price
for product 2 is equal to pmax2 and the seller will prefer to use a limited-availability scheme if and only
if
q

pmin1   c1

+ (1  q) (pmax2   c2)  v2   c2
,
0@ 1+1+ v2   v2
 (  1)

1+
1+ v2 + v2

1A 1 + 
1 + 
v1   c1

+
0@1 
0@ 1+1+ v2   v2
 (  1)

1+
1+ v2 + v2

1A1A1 + 
1 + 
v2   c2

 v2 c2:
(19)
Solving condition (19) for v1 yields
v1  1 + 
1 + 
h
(1 + )2    (1 + )
i
v2 + (1 + ) (c1   c2)
1 + 
:
On the other hand, if v2v1 

1+
1+
2
the rip-o¤ price for product 2 is equal to pmin1 and the seller
will prefer to use a limited-availability scheme if and only if
q

pmin1   c1

+ (1  q)

pmin1   c2

 v2   c2
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,
0@ 1+1+v1   v2
 (  1)

1+
1+v1+v2

1A 1 + 
1 + 
v1   c1

+
0@1 
0@ 1+1+v1   v2
 (  1)

1+
1+v1+v2

1A1A 1 + 
1 + 
v1 c2

 v2 c2:
(20)
Solving condition (20) for v1 yields
v1  1 + 
1 + 

c1   c2
 (  1)   v2

:
The conditions for when v2   c2 < v1   c1 can be derived in a similar fashion. 
Proof of Proposition 6: First, we prove that if the seller can create articial substitutes, a combina-
tion limited availability, bargains and rip-o¤s always yields higher prots than perfect availability. Let
v1   c1 > v2   c2 so that the maximum level of prots the seller can achieve with perfect availability is
v1   c1. If the seller can create perfect substitutes for item 1, then her prots are equal to
bq p1;1   c1+ (1  bq) pmin1   c1
where bq = q (; ; v; v; c; c). Then, it su¢ ces to show that
bq 1 + 2 (1  bq)  (  1)
1 + (1  bq)  (  1) 1 + 1 + 

+
1 + 
1 + 
(1  bq) > 1
, bq > 1 +  (  1)
 +  + 2
.
Substituting for bq yields
2 + 2   22 + 22  p2 ( + 1) (    + 1)p +  + 2
 (  1) ( +  + 2) > 0
, 2 (  1) (    + 1)

22 + 3 + 1

> 0
which is of course true for any  > 0 and  > 1. A similar argument applies if v1   c1  v2   c2.
Next, we prove the rst part of the proposition. Dene 1;2  

p1;2; pmin2 ; q; c1; c2

, 2;1 


pmin1 ; p

2;1; q; c1; c2

, 1;1  

p1;1; pmin1 ; bq; c1; c1 and 2;2   p2;2; pmin2 ; bq; c2; c2. Recall that q =
arg max
q

 
p1; pmin2 ; q; c1; c2

, q = arg max
q

 
pmin1 ; p

2; q; c1; c2

and let bq = arg max
q


pmini ; p

i;i; q; ci; ci

,
for i 2 f1; 2g. If v1 = v2 and c1 = c2, then pmin1 = pmin2 , p1;2 = p1;1 = p2;2 = p2;1 and q = 1   q = bq so
that 1;1 = 1;2 = 2;1 = 2;2.
Suppose to change v1 by dv1 and c1 by dc1 with either dv1 > dc1  0 or dv1  0 > dc1. By the
envelope theorem the e¤ect of these changes on prots are
d1;2 ' @1;2
@v1
dv1 +
@1;2
@c1
dc1 = q
@p1;2
@v1
dv1   qdc1
d2;1 ' @2;1
@v1
dv1 +
@2;1
@c1
dc1 =
"
q
1 + 
1 + 
+

1  q
 @p2;1
@v1
#
dv1   qdc1
d1;1 ' @1;1
@v1
dv1 +
@1;1
@c1
dc1 = bq
"
@p1;1
@v1
dv1   dc1
#
+ (1  bq)  1 + 
1 + 
dv1   dc1

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and
d2;2 = 0.
By substituting and re-arranging, we have that d1;1 > d2;1 since24bq + 2 (1  bq)  (  1) bq
1 +  (  1) (1  bq) 1 + 1 +  +

1  bq   q 1 + 
1 + 
 
2q (  1)

1  q

1 +  (  1) q
1 + 
1 + 
35 dv1 > 1  q dc1
, dv1 > dc1
where the last inequality follows from 1  q = bq. Similarly, d1;1 > d1;2 sincebq + 2 (1  bq)  (  1) bq
1 +  (  1) (1  bq) 1 + 1 +  + (1  bq) 1 + 1 +    q + 2 (1  q)  (  1) q1 +  (  1) (1  q)

dv1 > (1  q) dc1
,

2 (  1) q
1 +  (  1) (1  q)

2 + + 
1 + 

+
1 + 
1 + 

dv1 > dc1
where the last inequality follows from q = bq > 12 and dv1 > dc1.
Finally, consider the case in which v1   c1  v2   c2. Again, lets start with v1 = v2 and c1 = c2
and suppose to change v2 by dv2 and c2 by dc2 with dc2  dv2 < 0 so that v1   c1  v2   c2. By the
envelope theorem the e¤ect of these changes on prots are
d1;2 ' @1;2
@v2
dv2 +
@1;2
@c2
dc2 =
"
q
@p1;2
@v2
+ (1  q) 1 + 
1 + 
#
dv2   (1  q) dc2
d2;1 ' @2;1
@v2
dv2 +
@2;1
@c2
dc2 =

1  q
 @p2;1
@v2
dv2  

1  q

dc2
d1;1 = 0
and
d2;2 ' @2;2
@v2
dv2 +
@2;2
@c2
dc2 =
"bq@p2;2
@v2
+ (1  bq) 1 + 
1 + 
#
dv2   dc2.
By substituting and re-arranging, we have that d2;1  d1;2 since

1  q

(dv2   dc2)  (1  q)

2 (  1) q
1 +  (  1) (1  q)
2 + + 
1 + 
+
1 + 
1 + 

dv2   dc2

( 2 (  1) q
1 +  (  1) (1  q)
2 + + 
1 + 
+
1 + 
1 + 
 1
where the last inequality follows from q = 1  q > 12 and 0 > dv2  dc2.
Finally, we have that d2;1  d2;2 if and only if

1  q

(dv2   dc2)  bq 1 + 2 (1  bq)  (  1)
1 +  (  1) (1  bq) 1 + 1 + 

dv2 + (1  bq) 1 + 
1 + 
dv2   dc2
, 0  1 + 
1 + 

2 (  1) bq
1 +  (  1) (1  bq) + 1

dv2   dc2 (21)
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where the last inequality follows from bq = 1   q. Notice that, although dv2   dc2 > 0, condition (21)
might hold. Therefore, let ev2 be the value of v2 for which condition (21) binds. This completes the
proof of the proposition. 
Proof of Lemma 9: We already know that if a consumer of type v is indi¤erent between the plan of
buying only the bargain and the plan of always buying, then his equilibrium expected utility must be
negative since he is paying a price above his valuation and, moreover, he is facing uncertainty over the
price. Next, consider the equilibrium expected utility for a consumer with type v 2

v; vh1
i
. If he plans
to buy only the bargain item, his expected utility in equilibrium equals
(1  q)
h
v   pmin1 (v)
i
   (  1) q (1  q)

v + pmin1 (v)

: (22)
Di¤erentiating (22) with respect to v yields (1  q) [1   (  1) q]. On the other hand, if he plans
to always buy, his expected utility in equilibrium is
v   (1  q) pmin1 (v)  qp1 (v)   (  1) q (1  q)
h
p1 (v)  pmin1 (v)
i
: (23)
Di¤erentiating (23) with respect to v yields 1. Therefore, all consumers with type v 2

v; vh1
i
prefer
the plan to always buy to the plan to buy only the bargain item.
Next, consider the plan of buying only the rip-o¤ item and nothing otherwise. In this case the
consumersequilibrium expected-utility is
q [v   p1 (v)]   (  1) q (1  q) ([v + p1 (v)]) : (24)
It is easy to see that (23) is always larger than (24) since
v [1 +  (  1) q] > pmin1 (v) [1   (  1) q]
and therefore we have proved that all consumers with type v 2

v; vh1
i
prefer to always buy.
Last, consider the consumers with type v 2
h
vl1; v

. For these types, not buying is a credible plan
since pmin1 (v) > p
min
1 (v). Therefore, they are going to plan to buy with positive probability only if
they can make (weakly) positive utility in expectation. From (22) we have that a consumers expected
utility when planning to buy the bargain item and nothing otherwise is non-decreasing in his own type
if and only if 1    (  1) q  0. If this condition holds, then since a type-v consumer gets strictly
negative utility in equilibrium so would a a type-v if he were to plan to buy; therefore, the latter would
prefer planning not to buy. This argument does not work when 1    (  1) q < 0 because in this
case a consumers expected utility is decreasing with his type when he plans to buy only the bargain.
However, the utility of a type-v consumer when planning to buy only the bargain is equal to
(1  q)
h
v   pmin1 (v)
i
   (  1) q (1  q)
h
v + pmin1 (v)
i
= (1  q)
n
v   pmin1 (v)   (  1) q
h
v + pmin1 (v)
io
which is negative for 1   (  1) q < 0. Therefore, also in this case consumers prefer not to buy. By
the same argument, it is easy to see that these consumers would never plan to buy only the rip-o¤
either and this concludes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 7: From Lemma 9 we know that for a given marginal type v, types above v
plan to always buy and types below v plan to never buy. Then, the problem reduces to a standard
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monopoly-pricing one where the seller charges an expected price equal to
qp1 (v) + (1  q) pmin1 (v) = v
where   4 22+22+4+2 2
p
2(2++)(1+)(1+ )
( 1)(1+) > 1. Let bv1 be the prot-maximizing marginal
type. In equilibrium a consumer of type-v attains a positive expected utility if and only if
v  (1  q) pmin1 (bv1) + qp1 (bv1) +  (  1) q (1  q) hp1 (bv1)  pmin1 (bv1)i  vs1
and this concludes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 8: Suppose p1 = pmin1  1+1+v. Then, not buying is not a credible plan for the
consumers and for a given q their perceived expected utility when planning to buy item 1 if available
and nothing otherwise is
EU [f1;?g j f1;?g] = eq v   pmin1   eq (1  eq)  (  1) v + pmin1  (25)
where eq = q > q. Consumers will be indi¤erent between the above plan and the plan to always if and
only if
p2  v +

2 (  1) eq
1 +  (  1) eq

pmin1  p2.
This pair of prices provides the seller with prots equal to
qpmin1 + (1  q) p2:
The above expression is maximized at
q =
p
2 ( + 1) ( +  + 2) (  +  + 1)
 (  1) ( +  + 2)  
1
 (  1) .
Next, notice that expression (25) is a continuous function of eq, and its value is 0 for eq = 0 and
v   pmin1 > 0 for eq = 1. Furthermore, its derivative evaluated at eq = 0 is equal to
v   pmin1    (  1)

v + pmin1

=   (  1)
1 + 
(1 +  + ) v < 0
and therefore it must have another zero for eq 2 (0; 1); it follows that
0 = eq v   pmin1   eq (1  eq)  (  1) v + pmin1 
, q = 1 +  + 
2 +  + 
,  = 
33 + 32 + 422   3+ 42+ 8  3 + 6 + 6
2 (1 + ) ( + + 2)
 e.
Therefore, for   e consumers perceived expected utility is zero. But then,the seller can set
q = 1 and p1 = v without a¤ecting consumersperceived expected utility. In this case, since consumers
believe they will consume item 1 at price v for sure, the highest price they are willing to pay for item
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2 if they do not nd item 1 available is
p2 = v

1 +
 (  1)
1 + 

and it is easy to see that this scheme provides the seller with higher prots since consumersrealized
consumption utility is at most zero in any contingency. 
B Partial Commitment
While retailers frequently advertise their good deals, it is rather uncommon to see a store publicizing
its high prices. Therefore, consistently with this observation about storesadvertising patterns, in this
section I assume that in period 0 the seller commits only to the price of the bargain pmini , i = 1; 2; and
its degree of availability. In this case, consumers form rational expectations about the price of the item
that is not publicly advertised.
Suppose that the products are close substitutes and the seller uses item 1 as the bargain by an-
nouncing that she has q units of it available for sale at price pmin1 . Once at the store, a buyer who had
planned to buy item 1 if available and item 2 otherwise will follow his plan and buy item 2 when this
is the only item left in the store if
U [(v2; p2) j f1; 2g]  U [(0; 0) j f1; 2g]
, p2 
(1 + ) v2 +  (  1) q

1+
1+

v1
1 + q +  (1  q) . (26)
Notice that this price is higher than the one we found under full commitment because now the price
of the rip-o¤ is the highest price consumers are willing to pay ex-post. However, for the consumers to
be willing to make the plan of always buying to begin with, the sellers announced degree of availability
for the bargain must be such that
EU [f1; 2g j f1; 2g]  EU [f2;?g j f2;?g] . (27)
To have an optimum for the seller both conditions (26) and (27) have to bind, dening a system of
two non-linear equations in q and p2. The relevant solution is
p2 =
v1 (1 + ) (1 + 2) + v2 (1 + ) (1 +  + ) 
p
Y
2 (1 + )
q =
v2 (1 + )  1+2(1+)
h
v1 (1 + ) (1 + 2) + v2 (1 + ) (1 +  + ) 
p
Y
i
v1 (1 + ) (  1) + v2 (1 + ) (  1)
where
Y  v21 (1 + )2 (2 + 1)2+v22 (1   + )2 (1 + )2 2v1v2 (1 + ) (1 + )

    22    + 22  1

:
Similarly, if the goods are close substitutes and the seller uses item 2 as the bargain, degree of
53
availability of item 1 and its price are
p1 =
v1 (  1) (1 + ) + v2 (1 + 2) (2 +  + ) 
p
Z
2 (1 + )
q =
v2

2     22     22+ 2   2

  v1
 
   2 + + 2+ 1
v2 (  1) ( +  + 2)
+
1+
2(1+)
h
v1 (  1) (1 + ) + v2 (1 + 2) (2 +  + ) 
p
Z
i
v2 (  1) ( + + 2)
where
Z  v212 (1 + )2 (1 + )2+v22 (1 + 2)2 (2 +  + )2 2v1v2 ( + 2 + 2+ 3) (1 + ) (2 +  + ) :
Compared to the situation where she is able to commit in advance to both prices, now the price of
the rip-o¤ is higher but the degree of availability of the bargain is higher as well. Intuitively, since the
seller is charging a higher price for the rip-o¤, and the consumers anticipate this, she must compensate
them with a higher ex-ante chance of making a deal otherwise they would not plan to always buy.
Thus, given both prices, the seller is not choosing the degree of availability that maximizes her prots.
This is because by not committing in advance to the price of the rip-o¤, the seller must use the degree
of availability of the bargain to induce the consumers to select the to plan to always buy. Furthermore,
the optimal degree of availability with full commitment takes into account also the di¤erence in the
marginal costs of the two items, whereas with partial commitment it does not. Therefore, the sellers
prots are lower when she cannot commit to both prices.
Unfortunately, in this case it is hard to obtain a full characterization, like the one in proposition
1, for when the seller would nd it protable to use a limited-availability strategy made of bargains
and rip-o¤s. Nevertheless, a combination of bargains and rip-o¤s might be prot-maximizing as the
following example shows.
Example 7 Let v1 = 250, v2 = 230, c1 = 20 and c2 = 10. If the seller produces only one good, then
she would produce item 1 and price it at p1 = 250, obtaining a prot of 230. Let  = 1 and  = 2
and suppose the seller uses item 1 as a bargain by pricing it at pmin1 =
500
3 . In this case the seller will
also commit to sell q = 2119
p
3459   75119 units of item 1 and will price item 2 at p2 = 710   203
p
3459,
obtaining a prot of 250.15.
Moreover, example 7 shows that also in this case of partial commitment the seller might prefer to use
the superior item as the bargain, exactly for the same reason as in the analysis with full commitment.45.
45For the parameters in example 7, if the seller were to use item 2 as the bait by pricing it at pmin2 =
460
3
then the
optimal degree of availability of the bait would be 1 q = 1
23
p
489  12
23
and the price of item 1 would be p1 = 700  503
p
489
for a total prot of 237. 52. Less than what the seller can obtain by using item 1 as the bait, but still better than what
she would make by selling only item 1.
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